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ABSTRACT
The continuous expansion of the Internet in the past 20 years has greatly facilitated the 
booming development of Internet business. Unfortunately, some unscrupulous participants 
in Internet business conduct fraudulent activities for their own profits at the expense of other 
parties. In this proposal, we present our study on the fraudulent activities in two kinds of 
major Internet businesses—online advertising and E-commerce.
Online advertising is leveraged by online advertisers to deliver marketing messages to- 
potential customers. It serves as a significant source of revenue for web-based businesses 
and is crucial to a thriving Internet ecosystem. However, click fraud is posing a serious 
threat to online advertising systems. As the direct victims, advertisers still lack effective 
defense against click fraud. In this proposal, we present a novel approach for advertisers to 
detect click fraud without the helps from ad networks or publishers. Our proposed defense is 
effective in identifying both clickbots and human clickers, while incurring negligible overhead 
a t both the server and client sides.
In an E-commerce market, a store’s reputation is closely tied to its profitability. Sell­
ers’ desire to quickly achieve high reputation has fueled a profitable underground business, 
termed by us as a seller-reputation-escalation (SRE) market. An SRE market operates as a 
specialized crowdsourcing marketplace and facilitates online sellers to harness human labor­
ers to conduct fake transactions for improving their stores’ reputations. In this proposal, we 
characterize the SRE markets in terms of its prevalence, business model, market size, and 
the sellers and laborers involved. We also evaluate the effectiveness of the SRE services on 
reputation escalation.
An online photo could disclose much more information beyond what is visually depicted 
in the photo and what its owner expects to share. In this dissertation, we aim to raise public 
awareness of privacy risks resulting from sharing photos online. We first investigate the 
prevalence of privacy information among digital photos. Then we study the policies adopted 
by online media sites on handling the m etadata information embedded in the photos they 
host. Finally, we introduce an attack vector not yet exploited before and demonstrate its 
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Investigating Fraudulent and Privacy Activities in Online Business
Chapter 1
Introduction
W ith the popularity of the Web, the Internet has been widely used for conducting 
business communications, collaboration, and transactions for almost two decades. A 
number of web-based online marketplaces have sprung up such as Amazon, eBay, and 
Taobao. In the recent years, the global Internet coverage has been further increased 
thanks to the explosion of mobile devices. The Internet-related economy today 
accounts for an increasingly significant portion of global Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP).
Accompanied by the booming development of Internet business, Internet fraud 
has become a serious and pervasive security problem. W ith a monetary motive, mis­
creants defraud victims to disclose their personal information or conduct fraudulent 
transactions by various means such as distributing malware, presenting fraudulent 
solicitations, and hacking websites. Internet fraud has resulted in annual global 
monetary loss of hundreds of billions of US dollars [1].
In this dissertation, we characterize and detect the fraudulent activities in on­
line advertising systems and e-commerce marketplaces, and also assess privacy risks 
arising from online photo sharing activities. Specifically, we propose a novel de­
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tection method to identify the fraudulent clicks on the ads from the perspective of 
online advertisers; we conduct an in-depth measurement study on newly discovered 
underground markets, which facilitate e-commerce sellers to harness human laborers 
to perform fake transactions for rapidly improving their stores’ reputations; finally 
we investigate the prevalence of private sensitive information among digital photos 
and explore the potential privacy threats resulting from online photo sharing. For 
our future work, we plan to develop a novel detection system to capture those fake 
transactions conducted on e-commerce marketplaces.
1.1 D e tec tin g  Click Fraud in O nline A d vertising  
S y stem
In online advertising systems, advertisers pay ad networks for each click on the 
former’s ads, and ad networks in turn pay publishers a share of the revenue. As 
online advertising has evolved into a multi-billion dollar business [2], click fraud has 
become a serious and pervasive problem. For example, the botnet “Chameleon” 
infected over 120,000 host machines in the U.S. and siphoned $6 million per month 
from advertisers [3].
Click fraud occurs when miscreants make HTTP requests for destination URLs 
found in deployed ads [14]. Such HTTP requests issued with malicious intent are 
called fraudulent clicks. The incentive for fraudsters is to increase their own profits 
at the expense of other parties. Typically a fraudster is a  publisher or an advertiser. 
Publishers may put excessive ad banners on their pages and then forge clicks on 
ads to receive more revenue. Unscrupulous advertisers make extensive clicks on a 
competitor’s ads with the intention of depleting the victim’s advertising budget.
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Click fraud is mainly conducted by leveraging clickbots, hiring human clickers, or 
tricking users into clicking ads [15]. In an act of click fraud, both an ad network 
and a publisher are beneficiaries while an advertiser is the only victim, under the 
pay-per-click model. Although the ad network pays out to the publisher for those 
undetected click fraud activities, it charges the advertiser more fees. Thus, the ad 
network still benefits from click fraud. Only the advertiser is victimized by paying 
for those fraudulent clicks. Therefore, advertisers have the strongest incentive to 
counteract click fraud. In this dissertation, we focus on click fraud detection from 
the perspective of advertisers.
We propose a novel approach for an advertiser to independently detect click 
fraud attacks conducted by clickbots and human clickers. Our approach enables 
advertisers to evaluate the return on investment (ROI) of their ad campaigns by 
classifying each incoming click traffic as fraudulent, casual, or valid. The rationale 
behind our design lies in two observed invariants of legitimate clicks. The first 
invariant is that a legitimate click should be initiated by a real human user on a 
real browser. That is, a client should be a real full-fledged browser, and hence it 
should support JavaScript, DOM, CSS, and other web standards widely followed 
by modern browsers. The second invariant is that a legitimate ad clicker interested 
in advertised products must have some level of user engagement on the advertised 
website. Based on the design principles, we develop a click fraud detection system 
mainly composed of two components: (1) a proactive functionality test and (2) a 
passive examination of browsing behavior. The functionality test challenges a client 
for its authenticity (a browser or a bot) with the assumption that most clickbots 
have limited functionality compared to modern browsers and thus would fail this 
test. The second component passively examines each user’s browsing behaviors
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on the advertised website. Its objective is to identify human clickers and those 
much advanced clickbots that may pass the functionality test. To evaluate the 
effectiveness of the proposed detection system, we build a prototype and deploy 
it on a large production web server. Then we run ad campaigns at one major ad 
network for 10 days. The experimental results show th a t our approach can detect 
much more fraudulent clicks than the ad network’s in-house detection system and 
achieve low false positive and negative rates.
1.2 U nderstan d ing  th e  E m erging R ep u t at ion-E scalation- 
as-a-Service in E -com m erce S y stem
Due to its convenience and ubiquitous nature, online shopping has become one of 
the primary means for purchasing goods. In many cases, due to its global nature, 
lower cost, and fast delivery, online shopping is the preferred or even the exclusive 
means of acquiring a product. To offer a means for buyers to give feedbacks on the 
products and the sellers, a large number of online shopping markets including Ama­
zon and eBay have incorporated reputation systems. The reputation systems could 
encourage sellers to provide better products because through the scoring process 
they are rewarded with higher reputations, which in turn  can a ttract more business.
For instance, sellers with higher reputations are usually listed at the front by online 
market search engines, and shoppers are biased towards sellers with higher repu­
tations [66]. Thus, online sellers have strong motivation to improve reputations as 
quickly as possible. In the majority of reputation systems, sellers’ reputations are 
dominated by the number of transactions they complete and the number of positive 
customer ratings (or reviews) they receive.
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However, depending on the popularity of a product, it usually takes a long time 
for a seller to accumulate high reputation. As a result, a non-negligible number 
of insincere sellers have attempted to subvert the reputation systems using opinion 
spams and artificial ratings, among others. Several recent works [62, 53, 63] have 
aimed to tackle these problems. However, we show that the known reputation 
manipulation techniques are only the tip of the iceberg of an emerging underground 
industry that employs sophisticated methods to cater to online sellers who want 
to quickly boost their store reputations. We refer to such enterprises as seller- 
reputation-escalation (SRE) markets.
SRE markets operate in the crowdsourcing model, where online sellers hire in­
expensive human laborers to carry out fake purchase campaigns to accelerate rep­
utation accumulation. By fake purchases, we mean purchases that although they 
appear legitimate and complete as far as the online system is concerned, no real 
product or at most an empty package is delivered by a seller. This approach is far 
more elaborate and much more difficult, if not infeasible, to detect because a buyer 
appears to have genuinely purchased a product as opposed to just leaving a review 
or score for the product and its seller. Moreover, multiple individuals that do not 
know each other are involved in the process.
For insincere sellers, fake purchases can significantly increase their transaction 
volumes, product ratings, and positive reviews. The boost in overall reputation 
attracts legitimate customers and at the same time cements the seller’s ability to 
deal with negative reviews. Furthermore, the process is fairly scalable, and the seller 
may post up to hundreds of such tasks each day for quickly improving the store 
reputation. Therefore, SRE markets are seriously endangering existing reputation 
systems widely deployed in current e-commerce platforms. Although SRE markets
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have appeared for several years, we still lack insights into the basic characteristics 
of this underground enterprise.
In this dissertation, we perform a detailed analysis of SRE markets by infiltrating 
five SRE markets specializing in providing reputation-escalation services to sellers 
on Taobao marketplace [27], the largest consumer-to-consumer (C2C) online mar­
ketplace in China. We conducted daily crawls of these five markets for two months, 
collected 219,165 tasks posted by more than 11,000 online sellers, and continuously 
monitored these sellers’ activities on these markets. We characterized the sellers 
and workers involved, and we estimated the revenue generated and fake-transaction 
volume handled by these markets. Furthermore, we report a more threatening ser­
vice recently launched by one SRE market where Taobao sellers can increase their 
reputation scores significantly during a single day1 by paying less than $100 to the 
SRE market operators. Given our insights into the SRE operations, we propose pos­
sible intervention approaches from the perspective of defenders. Finally, we revisit 
the SRE ecosystem one year later to reveal how the dynamism of the SRE markets 
changes over time and track the statuses of these Taobao sellers we identified to be 
using SRE services before.
In summary, our main contributions are threefold:
• To our knowledge, we are the first to analyze in depth the operations of SRE 
markets and perform the empirical study of them. We estimate that the 
five SRE markets we infiltrated generated at least $46,438 in revenue and 
handled at least $3,452,530 in fake-transaction volume during the two months 
we monitored.
• We investigate the effect of SRE markets on online store reputation escala­
1A Taobao seller earns one reputation score for each completed transaction with good ratings.
tion. We find that online sellers using SRE services can increase their store 
reputations 10 times faster than legitimate ones, and about 25% of them are 
visibly penalized in the form of either having reputation scores deducted or 
zeroed, or being forcibly shut down.
•  We revisit the SRE ecosystem one year later and observe that the SRE markets 
are not as active as before. There are evident declines in daily new task 
postings and daily active sellers on the SRE markets. Moreover, about 17% 
of these involved Taobao stores do not exist any more, probably due to heavy 
penalties imposed by Taobao for fake transactions.
1.3 A ssessin g  P rivacy R isks on  O nline P h o to s
W ith the proliferation of cameras, especially smartphone cameras, it is now very 
convenient for people to take photos whenever and wherever possible. Furthermore, 
the prevalence of online social networks and photo-sharing sites greatly facilitates 
people to share their digital photos with friends online. Every day around 1.6 million 
photos are shared on Flickr [72], one of the largest online photo sharing sites.
In their rush to share digital photos online, well-intentioned people unwittingly 
expose much hidden m etadata information contained in the digital photos. The 
m etadata information such as camera serial number may seem relatively innocent 
and trivial but could create significant privacy threats to photographers2 and the 
people depicted in the photo. Unfortunately, one study [85] shows that up to 40% 
of high-degree participants do not even know the term metadata. The situation
2 By photographer we mean the person who took the photo rather than a person who works as 
a photographer.
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becomes worse concerning the fact that a photo could linger on the Internet for 
years.
During the spread of a digital photo, online social network (OSN) services and 
other media sites usually serve as the sink. Online media sites often compress 
and resize the photos they host for space saving. Media sites may even remove 
the m etadata information in the photos they host. However, users usually do not 
know what the online services will do with their uploaded photos [85]. Thus, it 
is important to raise the public awareness of the potential privacy risks posed by 
metadata leakage and increase their knowledge of how online media sites handle the 
photos they uploaded.
To better describe contemporary digital photos, we create a taxonomy and clas­
sify digital photos into different stages based on the life cycle and the propagation 
process, which are: “fresh,” “intact,” and “wild.” “Fresh” photos are just freshly 
taken with a camera. “Intact” photos have been uploaded online but remain intact 
from the hosting sites. “Wild” photos may have been post-processed multiple times 
by the hosting sites. In this dissertation, we perform a data-driven assessment of 
privacy risks on contemporary digital photos. Specifically, we examine digital photos 
at the three stages in terms of m etadata information contained and potential privacy 
risks, and we further explore the photo handling policies adopted by online media 
sites. Finally, we introduce a new attack vector and demonstrate that some other 
trivial looking m etadata information could be exploited to launch re-identification 
attacks against photo owners.
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1.4 Future W orks
In our previous work, we investigated a new advanced technique of manipulating 
seller reputations, i.e., the seller-reputation-escalation (SRE) service, which enables 
sellers to hire thousands of cheap human laborers to conduct fake transactions. 
Based on our deep understanding of this advanced reputation manipulation tech­
nique, for our future work, we are going to develop a  practical fake transaction 
detection system in cooperation with one large e-commerce marketplace. The pro­
posed system will allow e-commerce marketplaces to detect all existing forms of fake 
transactions in real time.
1.5 O rganization
The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents our 
research efforts on detecting click fraud in an online advertising system from the 
perspective of advertisers. Chapter 3 presents our investigation of an emerging un­
derground industry, termed as SRE markets, where a potentially unbounded number 
of inexpensive human laborers are hired by e-commerce sellers to conduct fake pur­
chases for reputation inflation. Chapter 4 describes our investigation of online photo 
privacy issues. In Chapter 5, we conclude the dissertation and propose our future 
research work on developing a practical and real-time fake transaction detection 
system from the perspective of e-commerce marketplaces.
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C hapter 2 
Click Fraud D etection  on the  
A dvertiser Side
Click fraud detection is not trivial. Click fraud schemes have been continuously 
evolving in recent years [14, 23, 12, 15, 19]. Existing detection solutions attem pt 
to identify click fraud activities from different perspectives, but each has its own 
limitations. The solutions proposed in [21, 20, 22] perform traffic analysis on an 
ad network’s traffic logs to detect publisher inflation fraud. However, an advanced 
clickbot can conduct a low-noise attack, which makes those abnormal-behavior- 
based detection mechanisms less effective. Haddadi [18] proposed to leverage bait 
ads for blacklisting malicious publishers based on a predefined threshold. Motivated 
by [18], Dave et al. [15] proposed an approach for advertisers to measure click- 
spam ratios on their ads by creating bait ads. However, running bait ads increases 
advertisers’ budget on advertisements.
In this chapter, we present our work on detecting click fraud in the online adver­
tising system from the perspective of advertisers. Our proposed detection mecha­
nism is composed of two components. The first component is proactive functionality
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test. We test a client’s functionality against web standards widely supported by 
modern browsers. Failing the test would induce all clicks generated by the client 
to be labelled as fraudulent. The second component is passive browsing behavior 
examination. Only if a client passes the functionality test and also shows enough 
browsing engagement on the advertised website, the corresponding click is labelled 
as valid. Otherwise, a click is labelled as casual if the corresponding client passes 
the functionality test but shows insufficient browsing behaviors. A casual click could 
be generated by a human clicker or by an unintentional user. We have no attem pt 
to distinguish these two since neither of them is a potential customer from the 
standpoint of advertisers.
Our detection mechanism can significantly raise the bar for committing click 
fraud and is potentially effective in the long run after public disclosure. To evade 
our detection mechanism, clickbots must implement all the main web standards 
widely supported by modern browsers. And a heavy-weight clickbot will risk itself 
of being readily noticeable by its host. Likewise, human clickers must behave like 
real interested users by spending more time, browsing more pages, and clicking more 
links on the advertised sites, which contradicts their original intentions of earning 
more money by clicking on ads as quickly as possible. At each point, the net effect 
is a disincentive to commit click fraud.
The chapter is organized as follows. We provide background knowledge in Section 
2.1. Then, we detail our approach in Section 2.2 and validate its efficacy using real- 
world data in Section 2.3. We discuss the limitations of our work in Section 2.4 and 
survey related work in Section 2.5. Finally, we conclude the chapter in Section 2.6.
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2.1 B ackground
Based on our understanding of the current state of the art in click fraud, we first 
characterize clickbots and human clickers, the two main actors leveraged to commit 
click fraud. We then discuss the advertiser’s role in inhibiting click fraud. Finally, 
we describe the web standards widely supported by modern browsers, as well as 
feature detection techniques.
2.1.1 Clickbots
A clickbot behaves like a browser but usually has relatively limited functionality 
compared to the latter. For instance, a clickbot may not be able to parse all elements 
of HTML web pages or execute JavaScript and CSS scripts. Thus, at the present 
time, a clickbot is instantiated as malware implanted in a victim’s computer. Even 
assuming a sophisticated clickbot equipped with capabilities close to a real browser, 
its actual browsing behavior when connected to the advertised website would still be 
different from that of a real user. This is because clickbots are automated programs 
and are not sophisticated enough to see and think as human users, and as of yet, 
do not behave as human users.
A typical clickbot performs some common functions including initiating HTTP 
requests to a web server, following redirections, and retrieving contents from a web 
server. However, it does not have the ability to commit click fraud itself but instead 
acts as a relay based on instructions from a remote bot master to complete click 
fraud. A bot master can orchestrate millions of clickbots to perform automatic and 
large-scale click fraud attacks.
Figure 2.1 illustrates how a victim host conducts click fraud under the command 
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F ig u re  2.1: How a clickbot works
exploiting the host’s security vulnerabilities, by luring the victim into a drive-by 
download or running a Trojan horse program. Once compromised, the victim host 
becomes a bot and receives instructions from a command-and-control (C&C) server 
controlled by the botmaster. Such instructions may specify the target website, the 
number of clicks to perform on the website, the referrer to be used in the fabricated 
HTTP requests, what kind of ads to click on, and when or how often to click [14].
After receiving instructions, the clickbot begins traversing the designated pub­
lisher website. It issues an HTTP request to the website (step  1). The website 
returns the requested page as well as all embedded ad tags on the page (step  2). 
An ad tag is a snippet of HTML or JavaScript code representing an ad, usually in an 
iframe. For each ad tag, the clickbot generates an HTTP request to the ad network 
to retrieve ad contents just like a real browser (step  3). The ad network returns
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ads to the clickbot (step 4). Prom all of the returned ads, the clickbot selects an ad 
matching the specified search pattern and simulates a click on the ad, which triggers 
another HTTP request to the ad network (step 5). The ad network logs the click 
traffic for the purpose of billing the advertiser and paying the publisher a share, 
and then returns an HTTP 302 redirect response (step 6). The clickbot follows the 
redirection path (possibly involving multiple parties) and finally loads the advertised 
website (step 7). The advertiser returns back the landing page 1 to the clickbot 
(step 8). At this point, the clickbot completes a single act of click fraud. Every 
time an ad is “clicked” by a clickbot, the advertiser pays the ad network and the 
involved publisher receives remuneration from the ad network. Note that a clickbot 
often works in the background to avoid raising suspicion, thus all HTTP requests 
in Figure 2.1 are generated without the victim’s awareness.
2.1.2 Human clickers
Human clickers are the people who are hired to click on the designated ads and get 
paid in return. Human clickers have financial incentives to click on ads as quickly 
as possible, which distinguishes them from real users who are truly interested in the 
advertised products. For instance, a real user tends to read, consider, think, and 
surf the website in order to learn more about a product before purchase. A paid 
clicker has few such interests, and hence tends to get bored quickly and spends little 
time on the site [13].
la n d in g  page is a single web page that appears in response to clicking on an ad.
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2.1.3 Advertisers
Advertisers are in a vantage point to observe and further detect all fraudulent ac­
tivities committed by clickbots and human clickers. To complete click fraud, all 
fraudulent HTTP requests must be finally redirected to the advertised website, no 
m atter how many intermediate redirections and parties are involved along the way. 
This fact indicates that both clickbots and human clickers must finally communi­
cate with the victim advertiser. Thus, advertisers have the advantage of detecting 
clickbots and human clickers in the course of communication. In addition, as the 
revenue source of online advertising, advertisers have the strongest motivation to 
counteract click fraud.
2.1.4 W eb standards and feature detection  techniques
The main functionality of a browser is to retrieve remote resources (HTML, style, 
and media) from web servers and present those resources back to a user [4]. To cor­
rectly parse and render the retrieved HTML document, a browser should be com­
pliant with HTML, CSS, DOM, and JavaScript standards which are represented 
by scriptable objects. Each object is attached with features including properties, 
methods, and events. For instance, the features attached to the DOM object include 
create Attribute, getElementsByTagName, title, domain, url, and many others. Ev­
ery modern browser supports those features. However, different browser vendors 
(and different versions) vary in support levels for those web standards, or they im­
plement proprietary extensions all their own. To ensure that websites are displayed 
properly in all mainstream browsers, web developers usually use a common tech­
nique called feature detection to help produce JavaScript code with cross-browser 
compatibility.
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Feature detection is a technique that identifies whether a feature or capability 
is supported by a  browser’s particular environment. One of the common techniques 
used is reflection. If the browser does not support a particular feature, JavaScript 
engines return null when referencing the feature; otherwise, JavaScript returns a 
non-null string. For instance, if the JavaScript statement “document.createElement” 
returns null in a specific browser, it indicates that the browser does not support the 
method createElement attached to the document object. Likewise, by testing a 
browser against a large number of fundamental features specified in web standards 
for modern browsers, we can estimate the browser’s support level for those web 
standards, which helps validate the authenticity of the execution environment as a 
real browser.
Feature detection techniques have three primary advantages. First, feature de­
tection can be an effective mechanism to detect clickbots. A clickbot cannot “pass” 
the feature detection unless it has implemented the main functionality of a real 
browser. Second, feature detection stresses the client’s functionality thoroughly, 
and even a large pool of features can be used for feature detection in a fast and 
efficient manner. Lastly, the methods used for feature detection are designed to 
work across different browsers and will continue to work over time as new browsers 
appear, because new browsers fundamentally support reflection—even before imple­
menting other features—and should also extend, rather than replace, existing web 
standards.
2.2 M eth od o logy
Our approach mainly challenges a visiting client and its user engagement on the 
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F ig u re  2.2: Outline of click fraud detection mechanism
maximize detection accuracy, we also check the legitimacy of the origin (client’s IP 
address) and the intermediate path (i.e., the publisher) of a click.
Figure 2.2 provides an outline of our approach. Our detection system consists 
of three components: (1) JavaScript support and mouse event test, (2) browser 
functionality test, and (3) browsing behavior examination.
For each incoming user, on the landing page, we test if the client supports 
JavaScript and if any mouse events are triggered. No JavaScript support or no 
mouse event indicates that the client may not be a real browser but a clickbot. 
Otherwise, we further challenge the client’s functionality against the web standards 
widely supported by mainstream browsers. The client failed the functionality test is 
labelled as a clickbot. Otherwise, we further examine the client’s browsing behav­
ior on the advertiser’s website and train a behavior-based classifier to distinguish a 
really interested user from a casual one.
2.2.1 JavaScript support and m ouse event test
One simple way to detect clickbots is to  test whether a client supports JavaScript 
or not. This is due to the fact that at least 98% of web browsers have JavaScript 
enabled [5] and online advertising services usually count on JavaScript support. 
Monitoring mouse events is another effective way to detect clickbots. In general,
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a human user with a non-mobile platform (laptop/desktop) must generate at least 
one mouse event when browsing a website. A lack of mouse events flags the visiting 
client as a clickbot. However, this may not be true for users from mobile platforms 
(smartphones/pads). Thus, we only apply the mouse event test to users from non- 
mobile platforms.
2.2.2 Functionality test
A client passing the JavaScript and mouse event test is required to further undergo 































































































Table 2.1: Tested browsers, versions and release dates
To avoid false positives and ensure that each modern browser can pass the func­
tionality test, we perform an extensive feature support measurement on the top 5 
mainstream browsers [6]: Chrome, Firefox, IE, Safari, and Opera. To discern the 
consistently supported features, we uniformly select 10 versions for each browser 
vendor with the exception of 5 versions for IE. Table 2.1 lists the browsers we 
tested. As a result, we obtain a set of 153 features associated with web standards,
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including browser window, DOM, and CSS (see Table 2.2). All those features are 
supported by both desktop browsers and their mobile versions. These features are 
commonly and consistently supported by the 45 versions of browsers in the past ten 
years. We call this set the authentic-feature set. We also create a bogus-feature set, 
which has the same size as the authentic-feature set but is obtained by appending 
“123” to each feature in the authentic-feature set. Thus, every feature in the bogus- 
feature set should not be supported by any real browser. Note that we just use 
the string “123” as an example. When implementing our detection, the advertiser 
should periodically change the string to make the bogus-feature set hard to evade.
O b jects Features
in- closed, defaultStatus, document, frames, history, alert, blur, clearlnterval, clearTimeout, 
close, confirm, focus, moveBy, moveTo, open, print, prom pt, resizeBy, resizeTo, scroll, 
scrollBy, scrollTo, setlnterval, set Timeout, appCodeName, appName, app Version, cookieEn- 
abled, platform, userAgent, javaEnabled, availHeight, vailW idth, colorDepth, height, width, 
length, back, forward, go, hash, host, hostname, href, pathnam e, port, protocol, search, 
assign, reload, replace
doctype, implementation, documentElement, createElement, createDocum entFragment, cre- 
ateTextNode, createComment, createA ttribute, getElementsByTagName, title, referrer, do­
main, URL, body, images, applets, links, forms, anchors, cookie, open, close, write, writeln, 
getElementByld, getElementsByName
backgroundAttachment, backgroundColor, backgroundlmage, backgroundRepeat, border, 
borderStyle, borderTop, borderRight, border B ottom , borderLeft, borderTopW idth, border- 
R ightW idth, borderBottom W idth, borderLeftW idth, borderW idth, clear, color, display, font, 
fontFamily, fontSize, fontStyle, fontVariant, fontWeight, height, letterSpacing, lineHeight, 
listStyle, listStylelmage, IistStylePosition, listStyleType, margin, marginTop, marginRight, 
marginBottom, marginLeft, padding, paddingTop, paddingRight, paddingBottom , paddin- 
gLeft, textAlign, textDecoration, textlndent, textTransform , verticalAlign, whiteSpace, 
width, wordSpacing, backgroundPosition, borderCollapse, borderTopColor, borderRight- 
Color, borderBottomColor, borderLeftColor, borderTopStyle, borderRightStyle, borderBot- 
tomStyle, borderLeftStyle, bottom, clear, clip, cursor, direction, left, minHeight, overflow, 
pageBreakAfter, pageBreakBefore, position, right, tableLayout, top, unicodeBidi, visibility, 
zlndex
Table 2.2: Authentic feature set widely supported by modern browsers
How to  perform the functionality test. Figure 2.3 illustrates how the 
functionality test is performed. For the first HTTP request issued by a client, 
the advertiser’s web server challenges the client by responding as usual, but along 
with a mixed set of authentic and bogus features. While the size of the mixed set is 
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F ig u re  2.3: How the functionality test is performed by advertiser’s web server.
Then, those individual authentic and forged features in the set are randomly selected 
from the authentic and bogus feature sets, respectively. The client is expected to 
test each feature in its environment and then report to the web server how many 
authentic features are in the mixed set as the response to the challenge.
A real browser should be able to report the correct number of authentic features 
to the web server after executing the challenge code, and thus passes the function­
ality test. However, a  clickbot would fail the test because it is unable to test the 
features contained in the set and return the correct number. Considering some 
untested browsers may not support some authentic features, we set up a narrow 
range [x — -N, x] to handle this, where x is the expected number and A  is a small 
non-negative integer. A client is believed to pass the test as long as its reported 
number falls within [x — N,  x]. Here we set A to 4 based on our measurement results.
Evasion analysis. Assume tha t a client receives a mixed set of 150 features 
from a web server and the set consists of 29 randomly selected authentic features 
and 121 randomly selected bogus features. Thus, the expected number should fall 
into the range [25,29]. Consider a crafty clickbot who knows about our detection 
mechanism in advance. The clickbot does not need to test the features, but just 
guesses a number from the possible range [0,150], and returns it to the server. In 
this case, the probability for the guessed number to successfully fall into [25,29] is
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only 3%. Thus, the clickbot has little chance (3%) to bypass the functionality test.
2.2.3 Browsing behavior exam ination
Passing the functionality test cannot guarantee that a click is valid. An advanced 
clickbot may function like a real browser and thus can circumvent the functionality 
test. A human clicker with a real browser can also pass the test.
However, clickbots and human clickers usually show quite different browsing 
behaviors on the advertised website from those of real users. Click fraud activities 
conducted by clickbots usually end up with loading the advertiser’s landing page and 
do not show human behaviors on the site. For human clickers, their only purpose is 
to make more money by clicking on ads as quickly as possible. They tend to browse 
an advertised site quickly and then navigate away for the next click task. Instead, 
real interested users tend to learn more about a product and spend more time on 
the advertised site. They usually scroll up and down a page, click on their interested 
links, browses multiple pages, and sometimes make a purchase.
Therefore, we leverage users’ browsing behaviors on the advertised site to detect 
human clickers and advanced clickbots. Specifically, we extract extensive features 
from passively collected browsing traffic on the advertised website, and train a clas­
sifier for detection.
2.3 E xp erim en ta l R esu lts
In order to evaluate our approach, we run ad campaigns to collect real-world click 
traffic, and then analyze the collected data to discern its primary characteristics, 
resulting in a technique to classify click traffic as either fraudulent, casual, or valid.
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Figure 2.4: A bait ad with the ad text of randomly selected English words
2.3.1 Running ad campaigns
To obtain real-world click traffic, we signed up with a major ad network and ran 
ad campaigns for a high-traffic woodworking forum website. Motivated by the bait 
ad technique proposed in [18], we created three bait ads for the site and made the 
same assumption as the previous works [15, 16, 18], that very few people would 
intentionally click on the bait ads and those ads are generally clicked by clickbots 
and fraudulent human clickers. Bait ads are textual ads with nonsense content, 
as illustrated in Figure 2.4. Note that our bait ads were generated in English. In 
addition, we created two normal ads, for which the ad texts describe the advertised 
site exactly. Our goal of running ad campaigns is to acquire both malicious and 
authentic click traffic for validating our click fraud detection system. To this end, 
we set the bait ads to be displayed on partner websites of any language across 
the world but display normal ads only on search result pages in English to avoid 
publisher fraud cases from biasing the clicks on the latter normal ads. We expect 
that most, if not all, clicks on bait ads and normal ads are fraudulent and authentic, 
respectively.
We ran our ad campaigns for 10 days. Table 2.3 provides a summary of our ad 
campaigns. Our ads had 2 million impressions2, received nearly 11 thousand clicks 
and had a click-through rate (CTR) of 0.53% on average. Among these, 2.7 thousand 
clicks were considered by the ad network as illegitimate and were not charged. The
2An ad being displayed once is counted as one impression.
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S e t C a m p a ig n C licks Im p re s s io n s  C t R In v a lid In v a lid A vg. D aily D u ra tio n
C licks R a te C P C B u d g e t (days)
1 b a itl 1,011 417,644 0.24% 425 29.60% $0.08 $15.00 10
2 bait 2 4,127 646,152 0.64% 852 17.11% $0.03 $15.00 10
3 bait3 5,324 933,790 0.57% 1,455 21.46% $0.04 $15.00 10
4 normal 1 288 68,425 0.42% 18 5.88% $0.40 $20.00 10
5 normal2 224 20,784 1.08% 10 4.27% $0.48 $20.00 10
Total NA 10,974 2,086,795 0.53% 2,760 25.15% $0.06 $85.00 10
Table 2.3: Summary of our ad campaigns
invalid click rate was 25.15%. The average cost per click (CPC) was $0.06. Note 
that the two normal ads only received 512 clicks accounting for 4.67% of the total. 
The reason is that although we provided quite high bids for normal ads, our normal 
ads still cannot compete with those of other advertisers for top positions and thus 
received fewer clicks.
2.3.2 Characterizing th e click traffic
We characterize the received click traffic by analyzing users’ geographic distribution, 
browser type, IP address reputation, and referrer websites’ reputations. Our goal, 
through statistical analysis, is to have a better understanding of both the users who 
clicked on our ads and the referrer websites where our ads were clicked. Although 
the ad network reported that our ads attracted close to 11 thousand clicks, we only 
caught on the advertised site 9.9 thousand clicks, which serve as data objects for 
both closer examination and validation of our approach.
G eographic d istribution. We obtain users’ geographic information using an 
IP geolocation lookup service [7]. Our 9.9 thousand clicks originate from 156 coun­
tries. Figure 2.5 shows the distribution of ad clicks by the top 10 countries which 
generate the most clicks. The distribution of normal daily visitors to the advertised 
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Figure 2.5: Distribution of click traffic vs. that of normal traffic by country
that X %  of ad clicks and Y%  of normal daily visitors are from that specific country. 
The top 10 countries contribute 77.7% of overall clicks. China alone contributes 
over 55% of the clicks, while the United States contributes 2.1%. This is quite un­
usual because the normal daily visitors from China only account for 0.11% while 
the normal visitors from the United States close to 76%. Like China, Egypt, Iraq, 
and other generally non-English countries also contribute much higher shares of ad 
click traffic than their normal daily traffic to the site. The publisher websites from 
these countries are suspected to be using bots to click on our ads. Even worse, one 
strategy of our ad network partner may aggravate the fraudulent activities. The 
strategy says that when an ad has a high click through ratio on a publisher website, 
the ad network will deliver the ad to that publisher website more frequently. To 
guarantee that our ads attract as many clicks as possible within a daily budget, the 
ad network may deliver our ads to those non-English websites more often.
Browser type. Next we examine the distribution of the browsers to see which 
browser vendors are mostly used by users to view and click on our ads. We extracted 
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Figure 2.6: Distribution of click traffic by browser
Figure 2.6 shows the distribution of the browsers used by our ad clickers. IE, 
Chrome, Firefox, Safari, and Opera are the top 5 desktop and laptop browsers, 
which is consistent with the web browser popularity statistics from StatCounter [6]. 
Notably, mobile browsers alone contribute to nearly 50% of overall traffic, much 
larger than the estimated usage share of mobile browsers (about 18% [8]). Close 
scrutinization reveals that 40% of the traffic with mobile browsers originates from 
China. China generated over 50 percent of overall traffic, which skews the browser 
distribution.
Blacklists. A fraction of our data could be generated by clickbots and compro­
mised hosts. Those malicious clients could also be utilized by fraudsters to conduct 
other undesirable activities, and are thus blacklisted. By looking up users’ IP ad­
dresses in public IP blacklists [9], we found that 29% of the total hosts have ever 
been blacklisted.
Referrers. Another interesting question would be which websites host our ads 
and if their contents are really related to the keywords of our ads. According to the 
contextual targeting policy of the ad network, an ad should be delivered to the ad 
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Figure 2.7: Distribution of click traffic by publisher
We used the Referer field in the HTTP request header to locate the publishers 
tha t displayed our ads and then directed users to our advertised website. However, 
we can only identify publishers for only 37.2% of the traffic (3,685 clicks) because the 
remaining traffic either has a blank Referer field or has the domain of the ad network 
as the referer field. For example, the Referer field for more than 40% of traffic has 
the form of doubleclick.net. We then examined, among those detected publishers, 
which websites contribute to the most clicks. Note that publishers could be websites 
or mobile apps. We identified 499 unique websites and 5 apps in total. Those apps 
are all iPhone apps and only generate 28 clicks all together. The remaining 3,657 
clicks are from the 499 unique websites. Figure 2.7 shows the distribution of the click 
traffic by those 504 publishers. The top 3 websites with the most clicks on our ads 
are all small game websites, which contribute to over 45% of publisher-detectable 
clicks. Actually, the top 7 websites are all small game websites. Small game websites 
often attract many visitors, and thus the ads on those websites are more likely to 
be clicked on. However, our keywords are all woodworking-related and evidently, 
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Figure 2.8: Percentage of clicks without JavaScript support for the top 10 publisher 
websites contributing the most clicks
the above mentioned contextual targeting policy, the ad network should have not 
delivered our ads to such websites. One possible reason is that from the perspective 
of the ad network, attracting clicks takes precedence over matching the ads with 
host websites.
2.3.3 Validating detection  approach
As described before, our approach is composed of three main components: a JavaScript 
support and mouse event test, a functionality test, and a browsing behavior exami­
nation. Here we individually validate their effectiveness.
JavaScript support and m ouse event test. Among the 9.9 thousand ad
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clicks logged by the advertised site, 75.2% of users do not support JavaScript. We 
labelled those users as clickbots. Note that this percentage may be slightly overesti­
mated considering that some users (at most 2% [5]) may have JavaScript disabled. 
In addition, those visits without support for JavaScript do not correlate with visits 
from mobile browsers. We have checked that nearly all mobile browsers provide sup­
port for JavaScript despite limited computing power. We then focused on the top 
10 publisher websites with the most clicks to identify potentially malicious publish­
ers. Figure 2.8 depicts the percentage of clicks without script support from those 
top 10 publishers. Among them, the two non-entertainment websites google.com 
and ask.com have low ratios, 9.4% and 15.2%, respectively. In contrast, the other 
8 entertainment websites have quite high click ratios without script support. There 
are 86 visits from tvmao.com and none of them support JavaScript. We believe 
tha t all 86 clicks are fraudulent and generated by bots. Similarly, 99.1% of clicks 
from weaponsgames.com, 96.1% of clicks from 3dgames.org, and 95.3% from games- 
girl.net are without JavaScript support either. Such high ratios indicate that the 
invalid click rate in the real-world ad campaigns is much larger than the average 
invalid rate of 25.15% alleged by the ad network for our ad campaigns, as shown in 
Table 2.3.
We observed 506 ad clicks (with JavaScript support) that result in zero mouse 
events when arriving at our target site. Of those, 96 are initiated from mobile 
platforms including iPad, iPhone, Android, and Windows Phone. The remaining 
410 clicks are generated from desktop or laptop platforms. Those 410 ad clicks also 
have few other kinds of user engagement: no mouse clicks, no page scrolls, and short 
dwelling time. We labelled them as clickbots.
We further investigated the click traffic from 4399.com due to the fact that this
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website generated the most clicks on our ads among all identified publishers. The 
following several pieces of data indicate the existence of publisher fraud. First, all 
853 clicks from 4399.com were generated within one day. Notably, up to 95 clicks 
were generated within one hour. Second, several IPs were found to click on our 
ads multiple times within one minute using the same User-Agent, and one User- 
Agent was linked to almost 15 clicks on average. Third, close to 70% of clients did 
not support JavaScript. Hence we suspect that the website owner used automated 
scripts to generate fraudulent clicks on our ads. However, the scripts are likely 
incapable of executing the JavaScript code attached to our ads. In addition, they 
probably spoofed IP address and User-Agent fields in the HTTP requests to avoid 
detection.
Functionality  test. The clickbots that cannot work as full-fledged modern 
browsers are expected to fail our functionality test. Among the logged 9.9 thousand 
clicks, 7,448 clicks without JavaScript support did not trigger the functionality test, 
and 35 of the remaining clicks with JavaScript support were observed to fail the 
functionality test and were subsequently labelled as clickbots. So far, 75.6% of 
clicks (7,483 clicks) had been identified by our detection mechanism to originate 
from clickbots. Among them, 99.5% (7,448 clicks) were simple clickbots without 
JavaScript support; and the rest 0.5% (35 clicks) were relatively advanced clickbots 
with JavaScript support yet failed the functionality test.
Brow sing behavior exam ination. After completing the two steps above and 
discarding incomplete click data, 1,479 ad clicks (14.9 %) are left to be labelled. 
Among them, 1,127 ad clicks are on bait ads while the other 352 clicks are on normal 
ads. Here we further classify the click traffic into three categories—fraudulent, 
casual, and valid—based on user engagement, client IP, and publisher reputation
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information.
Features. We believe that three kinds of features are effective to differentiate 
advanced clickbots and human clickers from real users. (1) How users behave at the 
advertised site, i.e., users’ browsing behavior information. (2) Who clicks on our 
ads, and a host with a bad IP is more likely to issue fraudulent clicks. (3) Where 
a user clicks on ads, and a click originating from a disreputable website tends to be 
fraudulent. Table 2.4 enumerates all the features we extracted from each ad click 
traffic to characterize users’ browsing behaviors on the advertised site.
F eature C ategory  T F eature D escrip tion
i  #  of to ta l clicks made on the  advertised site 
Mouse clicks i #  of clicks made only on the pages excluding the landing page
_______________ #  of clicks exclusively made on hyperlinks
#  of scroll events in total
#  of scroll events made on the pages excluding the landing page 
' #  of mousemove events in to tal
#  of mousemove events made only on the pages excluding the landing page 
Pages views ; #  of pages viewed by a user
Visit duration_________ How long a  user stays on the site____________
Mouse scrolls 
Mouse moves
Execution efficiency C lient’s execution time of JavaScript code for challenge_____________
Legitimacy of origin If the source IP  is in any blacklist________________________________________________
Publisher’s reputation If the click originates from an disreputable website
Table 2.4: Features extracted for each ad click
G round tru th .  Previous works [18, 15, 16] all assume that very few people 
would intentionally click on bait ads and only clickbots and human clickers would 
click on such ads. That is, a click on a bait ad is thought to be fraudulent. However, 
this assumption is too absolute. Consider the following situation. A real user clicks 
on a bait ad unintentionally or just out of curiosity, without malicious intention. 
Then, the user happens to like the advertised products and begins browsing the 
advertised site. In this case, the ad click generated by this user should not be 
labelled as fraudulent. Thus, to minimize false positives, we partly accept the above 
common assumption, scrutinize those bait ad clicks which have shown rich human 
behaviors on the advertised site, and correct a-priori labels based on the following
31
heuristics. Specifically, for a bait ad click, if the host IP address is not in any 
blacklist and the referrer website has a good reputation, this ad click is relabelled as 
valid when one of the following conditions holds: (1) 30 seconds of dwelling time, 15 
mouse events, and 1 click; (2) 30 seconds of dwelling time, 10 mouse events, 1 scroll 
event, and 1 click; and (3) 30 seconds of dwelling time, 10 mouse events, and 2 page 
views. We believe the above conditions are strict enough to avoid mislabelling the 
ad clicks generated by bots and human clickers as valid clicks.
Note that our normal ads are only displayed on the search engine result pages 
with the expectation that most, if not all, clicks on normal ads are valid. The ad 
campaign report provided by the ad network in Table 2.3 confirms this, showing that 
the invalid click rate for normal ads is only 5.08% on average. Based on our design 
and the ad campaign report, we basically assume that the clicks on normal ads are 
valid. However, after further manually checking the normal ad clicks, we found that 
some of them do not demonstrate sufficient human behaviors, and these normal ad 
clicks will be relabelled as casual when one of the following two conditions holds: 
(1) less than 5 seconds of dwelling time; (2) less than 10 seconds of dwelling time 
and less than 5 mouse events. The casual click traffic could be issued by human 
users who unintentionally click on ads and then immediately navigate away from 
the advertised site. From the advertisers’ perspective, such a click traffic does not 
provide any value when evaluating the ROI of their ad campaigns on a specific ad 
network, and therefore should be classified as casual.
Actually, if there is no financial transaction involved, only a user’s intention 
matters whether the corresponding ad click is fraudulent or not. That is, only 
users themselves know the exact ground tru th  for fraudulent/valid/casual clicks. 
For those clicks without triggering any financial transactions, we utilize the above
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Figure 2.9: Clients’ execution time of JavaScript challenge code in milliseconds
reasonable assumptions and straightforward heuristics to form the ground tru th  for 
fraudulent/valid/casual clicks.
E v a lu a tio n  m e tr ic s .  We evaluated our detection against two metrics—false 
positive rate and false negative rate. A false positive is when a valid click is wrongly 
labelled as fraudulent, and a false negative is when a fraudulent click is incorrectly 
labelled as valid.
C la ssifica tio n  resu lts . Using Weka [10], we chose a C4.5 pruned decision 
tree [24] with default parameter values (i.e., 0.25 for confidence factor and 2 for 
minimum number of instances per leaf) as the classification algorithm, and ran a 
10-fold cross-validation. The false positive rate and false negative rate were 6.1% 
and 5.6%, respectively. Note th a t these are the classification results on those 1,479 
unlabelled clicks. As a whole, our approach showed a high detection accuracy on 
the total 9.9 thousand clicks, with a false positive rate of 0.79% and a false negative 
rate of 5.6%, and the overall detection accuracy is 99.1%.
O verhead. We assessed the overhead induced by our detection on the client 
and server sides, in terms of time delay, CPU, memory and storage usages.
The only extra work required of the client is the execution of a JavaScript chal-
lenge script and to report the functionality test results to the server as an AJAX 
POST request. We measured the overhead on the client side using two metrics: 
source lines of code (SLOC) and the execution time of JavaScript code. The 
JavaScript code is only about 150 SLOC and we observed negligible impact on 
the client. We also estimated the client’s execution time of JavaScript from the 
server side to avoid the possibility that the client could report a bogus execution 
time. Note tha t the execution time measured by the server contains a round trip 
time, which makes the estimated execution time larger than the actual execution 
time. Figure 2.9 depicts the 9.9 thousand clients’ execution time of the JavaScript 
challenge code. About 80% of clients finished execution within one second. As­
suming that the round trip time (RTT) is 200 milliseconds, the actual computation 
overhead incurred at the client side is merely several hundred milliseconds.
We used the SAR (System Activity Report) [11] to analyze server performance 
and measure the overhead on the server side. We observed no spike in server load. 
This is because most of work involved in our detection happens on the client side, and 
the induced click-related traffic is insignificant in comparison with server’s normal 
traffic.
2.4 D iscu ssion  and L im itation s
In this project, we assume that a clickbot typically does not include its own JavaScript 
engine or access the full software stack of a legitimate web browser residing on the 
infected host. A sophisticated clickbot implementing a full browser agent itself 
would greatly increase its presence and the likelihood of being detected. A clickbot 
might also utilize a legitimate web browser to generate activities, and can thus pass 
our browser functionality test. To identify such clickbots, we could further detect
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whether our ads and the advertised websites are really visible to users by utilizing 
a new feature provided by some ad networks. The new feature allows advertisers 
to instrument their ads with JavaScript code for a better understanding of what is 
happening to their ads on the client side. W ith this feature, we could detect if our 
ad iframe is visible at the client’s front-end screen rather than in the background, 
and if it is really focused and clicked on.
In addition, compared to our user-visit related features (dwelling time, mouse 
events, scroll events, clicks and etc.), user-conversation related features3 are expected 
to have better discriminating power between clickbots, human clickers, and real users 
in browsing behaviors. However, our advertised site is a professional forum rather 
than an online retailer. If a user registers (creates an account) on the forum, it is 
analogous to a purchase a t an online retailer. However, such conversion from guest 
to member is an event too rare to rely upon to enhance our classifier.
2.5 R ela ted  W ork
Browser fingerprinting. Browser fingerprinting allows a website to identify a 
client browser even though the client disables cookies. Existing browser finger­
printing techniques could be mainly classified into two categories, based on the 
information they need for fingerprinting. The first category fingerprints a browser 
by collecting application-layer information, including HTTP request header infor­
mation and system configuration information from the browser [17]. The second 
category performs browser fingerprinting by examining coarse traffic generated by 
the browsers [26]. However, both of them have their limitations in detecting click­
bots. Nearly all the application-layer information can be spoofed by sophisticated
3Purchasing a product, abandoning an online cart, proactive online chat, etc.
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clickbots, and browser fingerprints may change quite rapidly over time [17]. In 
addition, an advertiser often cannot collect enough traffic information for finger­
printing the client from just one visit to the advertiser. Compared to the existing 
browser fingerprinting techniques, our feature detection technique has three main 
advantages. First, clickbots cannot easily pass the functionality test unless they 
have implemented the main functionality present in modern browsers. Second, the 
client’s functionality could be tested thoroughly at the advertiser’s side even though 
the client visits the advertiser’s landing page only once. Lastly, our technique works 
over time as new browsers appear because new browsers should also conform to the 
those web standards currently supported by modern browsers.
R evealed click fraud. Several previous studies investigate known click fraud 
activities, and clickbots have been found to be continuously evolving and become 
more sophisticated. As the first study to analyze the functionality of a clickbot, 
Daswani et al. [14] dissected Clickbot.A and found that the clickbot could carry 
out a low-noise click fraud attack to avoid detection. Miller et al. [23] examined 
two other families of clickbots. They found th a t these two clickbots were more 
advanced than Clickbot.A in evading click fraud detection. One clickbot introduces 
indirection between bots and ad networks, while the other simulates human web 
browsing behaviors. Some other characteristics of clickbots are described in [15]. 
Clickbots generate fraudulent clicks periodically and only issue one fraudulent click 
in the background when a legitimate user clicks on a link, which makes fraudulent 
traffic hardly distinguishable from legitimate click traffic. Normal browsers may also 
be exploited to generate fraudulent click traffic. The traffic generated by a normal 
browser could be hijacked by currently visited malicious publishers and be further 
converted to fraudulent clicks [19]. Ghost click botnet [12] leverages DNS changer
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malware to convert a victim’s local DNS resolver into a malicious one and then 
launches ad replacement and click hijacking attacks. Our detection can identify 
each of these clickbots by actively performing a  functionality test and can detect all 
other kinds of click fraud by examining their browsing behavior traffic on the server 
side.
Click fraud detection. Metwally et al. conducted an analysis on ad networks’ 
traffic logs to detect publishers’ non-coalition hit inflation fraud [21], coalition fraud 
[20], and duplicate clicks [22]. The main limitation of these works lies in that ad 
networks’ traffic logs are usually not available to advertisers. Haddadi in [18] and 
Dave et al. in [15] suggested that advertisers use bait ads to detect fraudulent clicks 
on their ads. While bait ads have been proven effective in detection, advertisers 
have to spend extra money on those bait ads. Dave et al. [16] presented an ap­
proach to detecting fraudulent clicks from an ad network’s perspective rather than 
an advertiser’s perspective. Li et al. [19] introduced the ad delivery path related 
features to detect malicious publishers and ad networks. However, monitoring and 
reconstructing the ad delivery path is time-consuming and difficult to detect click 
frauds in real time. Schulte et al. [25] detected client-side malware using so-called 
program interactive challenge (PIC) mechanism. However, an intermediate proxy 
has to be introduced to examine all HTTP traffic between a client and a server, 
which would inevitably incur significant delay. Like [18, 15], our defense works at 
the server side but does not cause any extra cost for advertisers. Our work is the first 
to detect clickbots by testing their functionalities against the specifications widely 
conformed to by modern browsers. Most clickbots can be detected at this step, 
because they have either no such functionalities or limited functionalities compared 
to modern browsers. For the advanced clickbots and human clickers, we scrutinize
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their browsing behaviors on the advertised site, extract effective features, and train 
a classifier to identify them.
2.6 C onclusion
In this project, we have proposed a new approach for advertisers to independently 
detect click fraud activities issued by clickbots and human clickers. Our proposed 
detection system performs two main tasks of proactive functionality testing and 
passive browsing behavior examination. The purpose of the first task is to detect 
clickbots. It requires a client to actively prove its authenticity of a full-fledged 
browser by executing a piece of JavaScript code. For more sophisticated clickbots 
and human clickers, we fulfill the second task by observing what a user does on the 
advertised site. Moreover, we scrutinize who initiates the click and which publisher 
website leads the user to the advertiser’s site, by checking the legitimacy of the 
clients’ IP addresses (source) and the reputation of the referring site (intermediate), 
respectively. We have implemented a prototype and deployed it on a large produc­
tion website for performance evaluation. We have then run a real ad campaign for 
the website on a major ad network, during which we characterized the real click 
traffic from the ad campaign and provided advertisers a better understanding of ad 
click traffic, in terms of geographical distribution and publisher website distribution. 
Using the real ad campaign data, we have demonstrated that our detection system 
is effective in the detection of click fraud.
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Chapter 3
E-com m erce R eputation  
M anipulation: The Em ergence of 
R eputation-Escalation-as-a-Service
In this chapter, we present our study on a newly emerging underground industry, 
so called SRE markets, in which a potentially unbounded number of inexpensive 
human laborers are hired by e-commerce sellers to conduct fake purchases for repu­
tation inflation. By fake purchases, we mean purchases that although they appear 
legitimate and complete as far as the online system is concerned, no real product 
or at most an empty package is delivered by the seller. This approach is far more 
elaborate and much more difficult, if not infeasible, to detect because the buyer ap­
pears to have genuinely purchased the product as opposed to just leaving a review 
or score for the product and the seller. Moreover, multiple individuals that do not 
know each other are involved in the process.
To provide an empirical analysis of the prevalence of the SRE markets, in this 
project, we answer some quantitative and qualitative questions about their current
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operations and structure: How popular are SRE markets with online sellers? W hat 
strategies have SRE markets forged for online sellers to evade fake transaction detec­
tion in online marketplaces? W hat kind of online sellers are involved in this shadowy 
ecosystem? How active are sellers on SRE markets? What is their actual effective­
ness? Has the sellers’ reputation been escalated as a result? W hat is the worker 
population? How much can a worker earn daily? W hat amount of fake-transaction 
volumes is handled by SRE markets monthly? How much revenue is generated by 
them each month? Are there any opportunities for disrupting the value chain of the 
black economy?
We organize the chapter as follows. Section 3.1 provides a brief introduction to 
Taobao and an overview of the business model of SRE markets. Section 3.2 describes 
our data collection methodology and data we collected. Section 3.3 presents the 
results from our infiltration of five SRE markets and our insights into the shadowy 
business. We evaluate the effectiveness of SRE services in Section 3.4, and discuss 
possible defensive interventions and limitations in Section 3.5. We revisit the SRE 
ecosystem one year later and present our new findings in Section 3.6. We review the 
related work in Section 3.7, followed by our conclusions in Section 3.8.
3.1 B ackground
The increasingly thriving e-commerce has drawn forth a large number of online 
sellers. For instance, eBay, the online marketplace giant, has 25 million sellers 
globally [28]. SRE markets have emerged to satisfy online sellers’ demands for high 
reputation. We identified five SRE markets which provide SRE services exclusively 
to online sellers on the Taobao marketplace. In this section, we first briefly introduce 




Taobao, launched by Alibaba Group [29] in 2003, is the largest consumer-to-consumer 
(C2C) online marketplace in China with more than 8.5 million sellers, over one bil­
lion product listings, and around 500 million registered users as of March 2015 
[30, 31]. Taobao has achieved great success with 60 million daily visitors and 50,000 
sales per minute, and is ranked 9th globally by Alexa [32] as of this writing. In 2013, 
the total gross merchandise traded on Alibaba was more than Amazon and eBay’s 
gross sales combined [33].
To facilitate shopping on Taobao, Alibaba operates Alipay and AliWangWang. 
Alipay serves as an online payment system which provides escrow services for buyers 
— holding buyer’s payment until the buyer is happy with the goods received. Ali­
WangWang is an embedded instant messaging program, commonly used for Taobao 
buyers to communicate with sellers prior to the purchase.
The great success of Taobao makes it an ideal host for miscreants such as the op­
erators of SRE markets, which accumulate wealth by providing reputation-escalation 
services to Taobao sellers. Though not yet reported, the other major online market­
places such as Amazon and eBay may also suffer from fake transactions conducted 
through SRE markets.
3.1.2 How a Typical SRE Market Works
SRE markets operate in the crowdsourcing mode and are at the center of the shad­
owy ecosystem, which connects insincere online sellers who desire for high reputation 
with people who want to earn extra money. However, unlike other crowdsourcing
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(5) Instruct the worker to conduct fake purchase on Taobao by following the task description 
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Figure 3.1: Lifecycle of a fake-purchase task on the SRE market.
markets such as Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) [42], these SRE markets only 
accommodate one kind of task: conducting fake transactions on the specified Taobao 
stores. According to the terminology used on crowdsourcing markets, online sellers 
on SRE markets act as task requesters while people undertaking fake-purchase tasks 
act as task workers.
Figure 3.1 illustrates a  typical lifecycle of a fake-purchase task on a SRE market. 
We classify the lifecycle into five distinct stages: task creation, task undertaken, 
conducting fake purchase on Taobao, order fulfillment, and commission realization.
Task Creation. The lifecycle of a fake-purchase task begins with an online 
seller creating a task on the SRE market. To this end, the seller must first deposit 
money into the SRE market at the amount equivalent to the sum of the goods’ 
value designated in the task and the commission fee calculated by the SRE market 
(Step 1). Then, the seller creates a task and customizes an associated qualification 
requirement to limit which workers are qualified to undertake this task (Step 2).
Q ualification R equirem ent. The qualification requirement is composed of 
several qualification types predefined by an SRE market. Table 3.1 lists the quali­
fication types provided by an SRE market. Each one describes a qualification that
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Q ualification  T yp es
Q l:  The worker must have an am ount of guaranteed money held by the SRE market.
Q 2: The Taobao account used by the worker for taking tasks must be verified and pre-aged.
Q 3: The worker’s Taobao account m ust not be used a lot for fake purchases on the SRE market.
Q 4: The worker should be proficient, reflected by her score value on the SRE market.
Q 5: The worker should be located in the geographic region specified in the task.
Q6= The worker never undertakes prior tasks posted by this seller._______________________________________
Table 3.1: Qualification types
a worker must have in order to take on the task and is believed to help the seller 
reduce the risk of being penalized by Taobao for fake transactions. Qualification 
Q l requires a worker to have an amount of money held by the SRE market in case 
a dishonest worker intentionally complains about the seller to Taobao and requests 
a refund for her purchase even though she gets rewarded for making the fake pur­
chase. Q2 requires the Taobao buyer account used by the worker for undertaking 
tasks to be verified and pre-aged1, which allows the seller to evade simple detection 
heuristics used by Taobao for suspending freshly minted accounts based on weak 
signs of misbehavior. Q3 requires the worker’s Taobao account to not get involved 
in too many fake purchases because such accounts are probably being closely moni­
tored by Taobao. Q4 requires a worker to be familiar with the task flow. Q5 makes 
the requirement for workers’ geographical distribution represented by IP address to 
make the fake purchase appear more real. Q6 reflects the seller’s effort to diversify 
the workers to avoid triggering any Taobao alarms.
Task U ndertaken. In light of the qualification requirements, a professional 
worker usually has several pre-aged Taobao accounts on hand and takes turns using 
them to avoid using one account too often. The demand for Taobao accounts has 
inspired another service provided by SRE markets. Each SRE market serves as an
1 Pre-aged Taobao account refers to the account that has been created for some time and ever 
used for real purchases.
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account merchant that stockpiles a multitude of Taobao accounts and can sell them 
to workers at a whim. The prices for Taobao accounts range from $0.2 to $0.5 each 
depending on the account’s age and purchase history. After purchasing a specific 
number of Taobao accounts from the SRE market (Step 3), the worker chooses a 
qualified task to work on (Step 4).
C lass D e ta il
Goods Type (physical or virtual), Selling price
Commission Commission fee offered for this task
Browsing behavior Search first on Taobao by the keywords given, randomly choose three other 
stores to browse before finally entering the seller’s store.
Like the store and add it to favorites.
Stay on the page for 5 minutes and scroll down to the bottom  before adding 
to  cart.
Feign chat with the seller via Taobao’s built-in IM program AliWangWang.




Use the shipping address designated by the seller for the order placed. 
Confirm the delivery and leave good ratings and positive reviews after a  pre­
defined waiting time.
Table 3.2: A typical task description
C onducting Fake Purchase on Taobao. After attaching a Taobao account 
to the task, the worker first starts chatting with the seller posting the task through 
a third-party Instant Messaging (IM) program on the SRE site. After further check­
ing the worker’s Taobao account against the qualification requirements, the seller 
instructs the worker to follow the task description and behave like a real buyer on 
Taobao (Step 5). Table 3.2 enumerates a typical task description. It describes the 
type of goods to purchase (physical or virtual), its selling price, and the commission 
fee offered. It also details the required browsing behaviors on Taobao before check­
ing out, the payment method, shipping address, as well as the timing for delivery 
confirmation and leaving positive reviews.
Order Fulfillment. After finishing all the required actions listed in the task 
description, the worker gets to the checkout step and provides payment to Taobao’s 
escrow-based system Alipay using either her own form of allowed payment or the
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e-Gift card provided by the seller (Step 6). Then the seller arranges to fulfill the 
order. For virtual goods such as software and prepaid phone cards, the order is 
directly fulfilled via the Internet, and the worker is required to confirm the receipt 
and leave good ratings immediately after checkout. For physical goods such as 
clothes, the seller never ships out the ordered goods but is required by Taobao to 
provide a mail tracking label for package tracking. To evade detection, for each task 
with physical goods, the seller purchases one express mail tracking label from the 
SRE market a t a price of $0.4-0.7, depending on the shipment companies (Step 7). 
SRE markets usually partner with shipment companies to get a stable supply of 
fresh and unscanned express tracking labels. With the label purchased, the seller 
inputs the label number into Taobao and hence fulfills the order (Step 8). Some 
sellers may ship an empty package to the designated shipping address while most 
ship nothing.
C om m ission R ealization. After a predefined wait time elapses, the worker 
confirms the receipt of the goods on Taobao (Step 9). In addition, the worker 
must rate the seller with a full score and write positive reviews with the contents 
either specified in the task description or composed by the worker. Then the worker 
requests Alipay to release money from her Alipay account to the seller’s Alipay 
account (Step 10). Subsequently, the seller notifies the SRE market to release the 
money pre-deposited on the market when posting the task to the worker (Step  
11). Upon request, the SRE market withholds a portion (typically 20%) of the 
commission fee offered for the task and then releases the remaining money (the 
remaining 80% commission fee, along with the reimbursement if the worker paid for 
the goods with her own money) to the worker (Step 12). To this point, the lifecycle 
of a typical fake-purchase task is completed.
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Figure 3.2: Procedure of data collection.
In summary, the worker typically needs a verified and aged Taobao account, 
invests several minutes and tens of US dollars in purchasing goods, and gets a 
reward of several dollars after about 3 days; the seller needs to purchase an express 
mail tracking label if the goods in the task is physical and pays a small commission 
fee in return for accumulating a transaction and a good rating (review); the SRE 
market earns money from each task by withholding a part of the commission fee, 
selling mailing labels to sellers and Taobao accounts to workers. In the lifecycle of a 
task, two escrow-based payment services — Taobao’s Alipay and the SRE market’s 
payment system — play a key role in guaranteeing that the worker completes all 
required actions to earn the commission and that the seller pays a commission fee 
to the worker for the fake transaction.
3.2 D a ta  C ollection  M eth od o logy
In this section, we describe our crawling mechanism and summarize the dataset, 
followed by a discussion on ethical concerns.
3.2.1 Crawling M echanism
Figure 3.2 briefly illustrates the procedure of our data collection. First, we iden­
tify SRE markets (I). Then web crawlers are developed to automatically crawl the 
identified SRE markets for task postings and the profiles of users (i.e., sellers and
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workers) on the SRE markets (II). In order to recognize those sellers’ IDs on the 
Taobao marketplace, we manually undertake tasks for one month (III). For those 
sellers with their Taobao IDs recognized, we then crawl Taobao for their sales and 
reputation information to evaluate the impact tha t their acquisition of both trans­
actions and feedbacks conducted through the SRE markets have upon their Taobao 
stores (IV). Note that steps I and III are manual operations and the others are 
fully automated. We detail these steps as follows.
Identifying SRE M arkets. SRE markets usually advertise themselves to at­
tract new Taobao sellers and workers through online social networks, public forums, 
IM group chat, search engines, etc. We investigated these common haunts and iden­
tified five SRE markets in total. They are SKY [34], WOOD [35], EMPIRE [36], 
COOL [37], and NET [38]. All five markets have nearly identical web layout and 
source code. Whois domain lookup reveals that they have been founded for two to 
four years. We do not claim that our study covers all SRE markets, which is very 
challenging if not impossible. However, we believe that the five SRE markets we 
studied represent a reasonable coverage since they are some of the most active and 
popular SRE markets.
Crawling SRE M arkets. In early February 2014, we first registered an account 
on each market, then performed a few test crawls, and finally developed automated 
crawlers which exploit the cookies stored locally by SRE markets to bypass their 
CAPTCHA mechanisms and login prompts. During the two months from February 
21, 2014 to April 21, 2014, we conducted a comprehensive crawl of the five chosen 
SRE markets. Our crawled data includes task postings and the profiles of both 
sellers and workers on the SRE markets.
In an attem pt to record all task postings, we had to crawl the SRE markets
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continuously 24-hours/7-days because a task may immediately become invisible once 
undertaken by a worker. A task posting specifies what kind of workers are qualified 
for the task (see Table 3.1 for a list of qualification types) and provides a detailed 
description of the task including the goods involved, its price, commission fee offered, 
browsing behaviors required, payment method, and many more listed in Table 3.2. 
From the collected task postings, we extracted the involved sellers’ usernames on 
a SRE market and further employed the application programming interface (API) 
provided by the SRE market to crawl once daily for the sellers’ profiles on the 
market. A profile mainly contains the number of tasks ever posted on the market 
by the seller and when the seller first and last posted tasks. However, the publicly 
accessible worker-related data is only restricted to a list of the top 10 workers on 
each market, which is published and daily updated as an excitation mechanism. We 
crawled once daily for the list of the top 10 workers and further collected their profile 
information. A worker’s profile includes the total number of tasks undertaken, as 
well as the first and the last time to undertake a task.
U ndertaking Tasks. In order to examine the impact that a seller’s posting 
fake-purchase tasks on a SRE market has upon her online store in the Taobao mar­
ketplace, we have to figure out the corresponding Taobao ID of the SRE seller. We 
soon realized tha t only undertaking her task postings allows us to record her Taobao 
ID. Unfortunately, we cannot recognize a seller’s associated Taobao ID unless we 
undertake her tasks manually. To undertake a task, a Taobao account is required 
and we used our own legitimate Taobao account. During the month between Febru­
ary 21, 2014 and March 21, 2014, we conducted numerous attem pts to undertake 
a task and then abort the task immediately after the associated Taobao seller ID 
is recorded. In this way, we were able to identify more than 4,000 Taobao seller
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IDs. We failed to identify more seller IDs because either our Taobao account, SRE 
market account, or geographic IP does not satisfy the qualification requirements of 
many tasks.
Crawling Taobao. W ith the identified Taobao seller IDs, we were able to 
monitor the daily variation in transaction volume and reputation of each of those 
Taobao stores. To this end, we developed another web crawler and employed the API 
provided by Taobao to crawl Taobao once daily for those sellers’ profile information. 
A seller’s profile on Taobao mainly contains the following information: her seller 
ID, the major business she runs, the store start date, the current store reputation 
score, the transaction volume in the recent week (month, semi-year, and year), and 
customers’ rate.
We took a similar recipe as in [47] to make sure our continuous crawl was not no­
ticed by both SRE market operators and Taobao marketplace. Specifically, neither 
our IP nor accounts on SRE markets were blocked during the period of measurement. 
Also, we were not contacted by any operator or Taobao to inquire about our brows­
ing activities. So, we believe that our crawled data is valid and not tainted by SRE 
market operators. W ith the collected data from SRE markets and Taobao, we were 
able to examine the SRE market characteristics, evaluate the impact of SRE ser­
vices upon Taobao stores, and offer insights for designing a robust fake-transaction 
detection mechanism.
3.2.2 D ata Summary
Table 3.3 summarizes the dataset collected on the five SRE markets we infiltrated. 
Specifically, it enumerates the measurement period, the total number of task post­
ings, the number of active sellers, and the number of sellers with Taobao IDs suc­
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cessfully identified. As a result of the two-month collection of the five SRE markets, 
we collected 219,165 tasks in total, contributed by 11,130 Taobao sellers. Of them, 
4,162 sellers’ Taobao IDs were identified through our manually undertaking tasks 
for one month.
M arket P eriod T ask P o sts A ctiv e  Sellers Identified  Sellers
SKY 02/21-04/21 63,343 2,789 1,332
WOOD 02/21-04/21 54,824 2,968 1,232
EMPIRE 02/21-04/21 48,120 : 2,016 706
COOL 03/07-04/21* 39,823 1 2,419 657
NET 02/21-04/21 13,055 938 235
Total — 219,165 11,130 4,162
Table 3.3: List of the SRE markets we infiltrated, the months monitored, total 
task postings, active sellers during the time frame, and Taobao ID identified sellers. 
*This market went down between 02/21 and 03/06.
A comparison of Taobao seller IDs across the five markets shows that 52 of 4,162 
sellers posted tasks on more than one SRE markets. Excluding the overlapping 
seller IDs, we identified 4,109 unique Taobao seller IDs altogether.
3.2.3 Ethical Considerations
In our study, we identified sellers’ Taobao IDs by manually undertaking tasks. We 
emphasize that we did not purchase or register any fraudulent Taobao accounts 
but used our own legitimate Taobao accounts to undertake tasks. Furthermore, we 
never completed a single task but aborted a task immediately after we recorded the 
seller’s Taobao ID. Thus, we did not participate in fake transactions and strictly 
abided by Taobao’s terms and policies. In addition, we did not expose any Taobao 
IDs identified in this project, and all data crawled from SRE markets and Taobao 
is publicly available. Therefore, our work will not introduce any additional risk to 
SRE market operators or their sellers.
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3.3 SR E  M arket C haracteristics
Now we present our measurement results of the five SRE markets. We first examine 
the popularity of SRE markets. Then we investigate the strategies formulated by 
SRE markets to circumvent Taobao’s detection of fake transactions. Next we char­
acterize two key players on SRE markets: sellers and workers. Finally, we estimate 
the generated gross revenue and the total fake-transaction volume handled by the 
five SRE markets during our two-month monitoring.
3.3.1 SRE Market Popularity
D aily  active  sellers D aily n ew  tasks T im e  to  u n d ertak e (second s)
M arket A vg. M ax A vg. M ax A vg. M in
SKY ' 224 313 ’ 951 1481 230 2
WOOD 297 381 816 1132 260 1
EMPIRE 222 310 689 1035 243 1
COOL ! 233 517 i  663 1843 95 2
NET 59 102 138 276 288 1
Table 3.4: Statistics of daily active sellers, daily new tasks, and the time to under­
take a task on the five SRE markets.
We first attem pt to measure how attractive SRE markets are to Taobao sellers, 
in terms of daily active sellers, daily task postings, and how fast a task is undertaken. 
By active sellers we mean those sellers who post at least one task on a specific day. 
Table 3.4 lists the statistics of these metrics for each of the five SRE markets. All 
five markets but NET have more than 200 active sellers per day on average, and 
as many as 517 active sellers can be observed on the COOL market on a single 
day. In addition, hundreds of new tasks are posted every day on each market, and 
the average number of new tasks on the SKY market has almost reached 1,000 per 
day. The peak number of new daily tasks is observed on the COOL market, with 
1,843 posts. Moreover, a newly posted task is usually undertaken very quickly. The
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average time for a new task to be undertaken is less than 300 seconds (5 minutes) 
on all five markets. It is even faster on the COOL market at less than 2 minutes 
on average. The minimum time for new tasks to be undertaken is within 2 seconds. 
All these results indicate that SRE markets serve as popular distributors for fake 
transactions targeting the Taobao marketplace.
3.3.2 Strategies to  Evade Taobao D etection
The high popularity of SRE markets among Taobao sellers benefits from those sell­
ers’ confidence that they will not be detected or penalized by Taobao for fake trans­
actions, or at least the risk is quite low. Indeed, all five markets provide a set of 
similar guidelines for sellers to follow when posting tasks in order to circumvent 
Taobao’s detection system. Next we investigate Taobao’s detection mechanism and 
SRE markets’ tit-for-tat strategies.
The details about the implementation of Taobao’s detection algorithm are not 
publicly available, but many parameters have been learned from previous penalty 
from Taobao posed for fake transactions. The detection mechanism is believed to 
cover all steps in a purchase transaction.
R e s tr ic t io n  SKY WOOD EM PIRE COOL NET
IVA & Aged ~ 7.48 ~ 17.65 21.99 23.22 10.98
Use Frequency 15.26 36.78 38.47 39.97 23.20
Table 3.5: Fraction (%) of tasks with restrictions on workers’ Taobao accounts.
Taobao Buyer A ccounts. According to Taobao’s report, more than 90% 
of registered Taobao buyer accounts are ID-verified accounts (IVAs). Non-IVA 
accounts and newly registered ones would receive special attention. In addition, 
Taobao buyer accounts with too many purchases within a short time may have been 
put in some gray lists by Taobao for close monitoring. A Taobao store with a large
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portion of transactions from non-IVA accounts, newly generated accounts, or ac­
counts in gray lists would become a suspect of fake transactions. Correspondingly, 
SRE markets have restricted the number of tasks each Taobao buyer account can 
undertake per day to be less than six. Also, Taobao sellers on SRE markets can 
enforce extra restrictions on Taobao buyer accounts. Table 3.5 lists the fraction 
of tasks with restrictions on Taobao accounts among the total 215,292 tasks we 
crawled. Note that on the COOL market, 23.22% of tasks require that the workers’ 
Taobao buyer accounts must be IVA and pre-aged, and about 40% have restrictions 
on the frequency that a worker’s Taobao account can be used to undertake tasks.
R e s tr ic t io n  SKY WOOD EM PIRE COOL NET
Geographic dist. 0.59 9.89 1.87 3.92 1.44
Designated SA 10.09 19.72________8.03 7.68 12.17
Table 3.6: Fraction (%) of tasks with geographic preference and shipping address 
(SA) designated.
G eographic D istribution  & Shipping A ddress. W ithout a diverse pool of 
IP addresses and shipping addresses, fake transactions could be easily spotted by 
Taobao’s detection system. To avoid detection, workers on SRE markets are required 
to change IP addresses and clean up browser cookies between’two consecutive tasks. 
In addition, Taobao sellers can also set geographical preferences of the workers 
or require workers to fill in the shipping addresses of sellers’ choice to make fake 
transactions appear geographically distributed. Table 3.6 shows the fractions of 
tasks with geographic preference and shipping addresses (SA) designated. It shows 
that a small portion of tasks have restrictions on geographic distribution or shipping 
address, which is reasonable considering that workers on the crowdsourcing platform 
have already been very diverse.
Im itating a R eal Purchase on Taobao. In addition to buyers’ Taobao ac­
53
counts, IP, and shipping addresses, their browsing behaviors throughout the pur­
chase are also closely monitored. To imitate a real purchase, the majority of tasks 
on SRE markets require workers to show some of the following actions. (1) Search 
to enter: Search on Taobao for the designated goods with given keywords and lo­
cate the seller’s store; randomly choose three other stores to browse first and then 
enter the seller’s store. (2) Browse the store-. Browse several other goods first, then 
browse the designated goods page; scroll down to the bottom of the page and stay 
five minutes. (3) Like the store: Add the store to favorites. (4) Start a fake chat: 
Talk with the seller via Taobao’s built-in IM tool AliWangWang. Finally check out 
the goods. Table 3.7 summarizes the fraction of tasks with the required actions. 
Clearly, a large portion of tasks on SRE markets require workers to show at least 
one kind of browsing behavior of a real buyer. For instance, more than 73% of 
tasks on all five markets require workers to present at least one of the four actions. 
And “search to enter” is the most required actions. More than 47% of tasks on all 
five markets require the workers to enter the stores by first searching on Taobao 
with given keywords. Our results indicate that SRE markets have paid significant 
attention to evading human behavior based detection. Thus, defenders should not 
rely on only one kind of human behavior and should combine human behaviors with 
other features for accurate detection.
R e q u ire m e n t SKY WOOD EM PIRE COOL NET
Search to enter 66.80 51.81 53.43 68.34 47.38
Browse the store 17.69 17.11 41.14 28.42 54.31
Like the store 42.41 30.25 27.85 27.23 28.21
Fake chat 33.32 43.65 34.06 41.21 41.48
One or more 79.46 73.99 80.33 81.80 82.61
Table 3.7: Fraction (%) of tasks with requirements for each kind of browsing 
behavior before checking out. “One or more” denotes the tasks with at least one 
required action.
Paym ent. When checking out, a worker pays for the ordered products with
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either an e-Gift card provided by the seller or her own debit card. Credit card 
payment is usually not recommended on SRE markets to prevent insincere workers 
from disputing a credit card refund after completing the task. Tasks with e-Gift 
payment are often undertaken quickly due to no need of monetary investment. Table 
3.8 lists the fractions of tasks with the requirements for e-Gift payment and no credit 
card payment. It is clear tha t tasks with e-Gift card payment are quite limited, 
which is reasonable since too many transactions with e-Gift payment on a store 
may trigger alarm. Also, as expected, tasks with a declaration of no credit card 
payment are limited, as well. One possible explanation is that credit card payment 
is not very popular in China, and sellers try to avoid credit card dispute issues. This 
observation indicates that most workers pay with their debit cards.
R eq u irem en t SKY WOOD EM PIRE COOL N E T "
e-Gift payment 0 0.27 6.12 0 0.59
No credit card 4.73 2.32 0 0 0
T able 3.8: Fraction (%) of tasks with requirements for e-Gift card payment or no 
credit card payment.
Shipping. Taobao monitors package tracking information as well. For each 
transaction involving physical goods, a seller needs to submit one package tracking 
number to Taobao for buyer tracking. To create a fake illusion of shipment, a seller 
purchases a tracking label from an SRE market and submits the tracking number 
to Taobao. However, no real product or at most an empty package is delivered by 
the seller. Table 3.9 shows the fraction of tasks declaring to ship empty packages. 
We found that most tasks ship nothing to buyers, which means a fake tracking 
number is enough to avoid detection. This may be because it’s difficult for online 
marketplaces to verify the shipment of a package since goods are usually delivered 
using third-party shipping services.
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R equirem ent SKY WOOD EMPIRE COOL NET
Empty package 6.87______2.02__________ 0________0______ 0
Table 3.9: Fraction (%) of tasks declaring shipment of empty package.
02/21 02/27 03/06 03/12 03/19 03/25 04/01 04/07 04/14 04/21
Date
Figure 3.3: A breakdown of when to confirm the receipt. Numbers in parentheses 
in the legend denote the fraction of the total 219,165 tasks crawled on the five SRE 
markets.
R eceipt Confirmation and W riting P ositive R eview s. The last step to 
complete an online purchase is to confirm the receipt and write reviews. For workers 
on SRE markets, they must give the highest scores and leave positive reviews. The 
wait time for receipt confirmation is specified in each task and has nine possible 
values: immediately, 30 minutes, 1 day, 2 days, 3 days, 4 days, 5 days, 6 days, 
and 7 days. Figure 3.3 shows a breakdown of wait time of the total 219,165 tasks 
crawled on the five SRE markets. More than 50% of tasks require workers to confirm 
the receipt two to four days after placing the order with an attem pt to match the 
typical shipping speed. Slightly more than a quarter of tasks require immediate 
confirmation of receipt, and a close scrutiny indicates that nearly all of them are 
tasks with virtual goods, which is reasonable due to no need for shipping.
Preparation for A ppeal to  Taobao against Penalization. Although elab-
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R e q u ire m e n t SKY WOOD EMPIRE COOL NET
Email & phone 1.16 2.42 0.26 1.56 0.02
Confirm on AliW. 11.65 0 0 0 1.97
Guarantee $ 19.10 5.13 1.26 23.96 4.21
Table 3.10: Fraction (%) of tasks requiring leaving email address and phone num­
ber, confirmation on AliWangWang, and guarantee money.
orately conducted, a fake purchase may still be detected, and the sellers involved 
may be penalized by Taobao. However, sellers have the right to appeal against 
penalties by presenting evidence of real transactions. Although an express track­
ing label usually serves as strong evidence, to collect more evidence, some sellers 
require task workers to leave their phone numbers or email addresses in the placed 
orders. Some workers are also required to confirm the receipt of goods on other 
channels like AliWangWang. Moreover, to prevent malicious workers from report­
ing fake transactions to Taobao after getting rewarded, some tasks require workers 
to have guarantee money held by SRE markets. Table 3.10 lists the fractions of 
tasks with each of these requirements. Although only a small portion of tasks have 
these requirements, they reflect the sophistication of SRE markets against Taobao 
detection.
3.3.3 Effectiveness of SRE M arkets’ Evasion Strategies
SRE market operators have developed sophisticated strategies to evade Taobao’s 
fake transaction detection mechanism. Thus, it is quite interesting to check how 
those evasion strategies are effective against Taobao’s hidden detection mechanism. 
Specifically we evaluate their effectiveness by examining what percentage of those 
4,109 Taobao sellers who involved in fake transactions with their Taobao IDs being 
identified were ever penalized by Taobao in the two-month period, during which we
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monitored these sellers’ reputation growth on the Taobao marketplace2. We first 
describe Taobao’s punitive measures on merchant misconducts and then present our 
observation of the penalties suffered by SRE sellers for conducting fake transactions.
3.3.3.1 Taobao’s P un itive M easures
Taobao takes different punitive measures based on the seriousness of misconduct. 
Its major penalties are described as follows: (I) remove the transaction volume, 
reputation score, and customer reviews generated by a fake transaction; (II) demote 
the involved stores by lowering their rankings in Taobao search results; (III) take the 
involved products off shelves and do not display them on the Taobao marketplace for 
specific days; (IV) ban the stores from future advertising and promotion campaigns; 
(V) deduct penalty points from the involved stores’ reputation scores; (VI) zero a 
store’s reputation score; and (VII) (permanently) shut down the involved stores. 
The penalties VI and VII represent the two most severe penalties. Note that the 
above penalties may be imposed individually or jointly.
3.3.3.2 P enalties Im posed on SRE Sellers
Although we were able to monitor the daily variation in store reputation for each 
of the 4,109 Taobao sellers, we cannot observe the effect of the penalties I, II, III, 
or IV imposed on a Taobao store from outside. Thus, our findings may inevitably 
underestimate Taobao’s crackdown on fake transactions.
We focus on the three most severe and also observable penalties V, VI, and VII 
imposed on the SRE sellers by the Taobao marketplace. The penalty V is regarded
2 Although the manual collection of the 4,109 sellers’ Taobao IDs was completely done on March 
21, 2014, we began monitoring the already identified sellers’ reputation changes on the Taobao 
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to be imposed on a Taobao store if the store’s reputation score decreases compared 
with the day before. The argument is that a Taobao store’s reputation is supposed 
to monotonically increase with the time unless the penalty V is imposed. A Taobao 
store is considered to suffer from the penalty VI if the store’s reputation score is 
zeroed one day. A Taobao store is undergoing the penalty VII if our search for the 
store in the Taobao search engine continuously returns information showing that 
the store does not exist anymore before we ended our monitoring on April 21 , 2014.
We examined each SRE store’s reputation changes and its presence to spot any 
signs of the penalties V, VI, and VII imposed by Taobao. Among the 4,109 identified 
Taobao sellers, 932 (22.7%) sellers were observed to suffer from the penalty V, i.e., 
with points deducted from their reputation scores. 89 (2.2%) sellers underwent 
the two heaviest penalties VI and VII. More specifically, 9 stores had their store 
reputations zeroed and 80 stores were forcibly shut down.
For the sellers with the penalty V imposed on, we study how much price they 
pay for fake transactions in terms of penalty points. Figure 3.4 depicts the cumula­
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of the 89 heavily penalized sellers when 
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on SREs.
It shows that about 40% of these sellers had store reputation scores deducted by 1 
compared to the day before conducting fake transactions; for about 40% of these 
sellers, their store reputation score deduction is between 1 and 20 ; and for the rest of 
20% of these sellers, their reputation score deduction is more than 20. Taobao’s pub­
licly available penalty rules [41] show that Taobao makes the punishment decisions 
based on the total number of fake transactions and the frequency.
For those 89 severely penalized Taobao sellers, we further examined their char­
acteristics in terms of their reputation scores at the time of using SRE services, 
their store ages when penalized, and the possibly unusual reputation growth before 
penalized.
It is interesting to know the reputation scores of these Taobao sellers when their 
stores were shut down or reputations were zeroed. Figure 3.5 shows the CDF of 
reputation scores of the 89 SRE sellers at the beginning of using SRE services. 
About 65% of those sellers had reputation scores of less than 251, i.e., a diamond 
grade, when they started fake transaction campaigns on SRE markets, and about 
80% with reputation scores of less than 501, i.e., two diamonds grade. The results 
imply that most of those penalized Taobao stores had low reputation scores when 
they started to use the SRE services.
We also examined the shop ages of those sellers while being heavily penalized. As 
shown in Figure 3.6, about 70% of those sellers ran their Taobao stores for less than 
one year, about 50% of them ran Taobao stores for less than half a year, about 30% 
ran Taobao stores for only less than three months, and about 7% were penalized 
at the same month when they started their Taobao stores. The results indicate 
that the newly opened Taobao stores tend to use SRE services for escalating their 
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fake transactions to  be more easily detected by Taobao.
In addition, we wonder if those Taobao stores received any light penalties as ad­
vance warnings before being heavily penalized or if any unusually dramatic increase 
in reputation may trigger an alarm. For the 89 heavily penalized Taobao sellers, we 
examined the day-to-day variation in reputation scores. We found th a t 19 (21.3%) 
sellers underwent decrement of reputation scores at least once before being heavily 
penalized, which indicates that Taobao had noticed the fake transaction behaviors 
of those sellers and already imposed the relatively light penalty V as warning before 
further zeroing their reputation scores or shutting down their stores. One Taobao 
store was found to have its reputation score decreased for three times within 10 days. 
Moreover, 16 (18%) of the 89 sellers were found to have stunning growth in their 
reputation scores within one single day. The unusually rapid growth of reputation 
score within a short time period likely caused those stores to have store reputations 
zeroed or be shut down afterwards. For instance, one Taobao store had reputation 
increased by 2,957 within one day while its daily average reputation increase was 
usually close to zero, and then was shut down three days later. Next, we scrutinized
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how quickly the above 35 sellers got severe penalties after receiving warnings or 
showing unusual reputation growth. Figure 3.7 shows that all these 35 sellers were 
severely penalized within one month, 70% sellers suffered a heavy penalty within 
two weeks, and about 40% within one week.
3.3.3.3 S u m m ary
Our results demonstrate that 22.7% of the identified sellers received penalty points 
for conducting fake transactions and 2 .2% of these sellers had their store reputations 
zeroed or had their stores forcibly shut down. That is, according to our observation, 
Taobao penalized about 25% of the 4,109 sellers involved in fake transactions with 
their Taobao IDs identified. Given that other punitive measures taken by Taobao 
are not observable from outside, our results could underestimate Taobao’s counter­
measures against fake transaction campaigns in SRE markets.
3.3.4 Seller C haracteristics
Over the two months of measurement, we observed 11,130 Taobao sellers with at 
least one task posted on the five SRE markets. By manually undertaking tasks for 
one month from February 21, 2014 to March 20, 2014, we identified 4,109 unique 
Taobao seller IDs and subsequently crawled their profiles on Taobao. In this section, 
we first show what kind of Taobao sellers are more likely to use an SRE service based 
on the profiles of the 4,109 identified sellers. Then we feature how active those sellers 
are on SRE markets.
S to re  S ta r t  D a te . The last day we manually undertook tasks was March 20, 
2014. We chose this day as a reference date to calculate the age of those sellers’ 
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Figure 3.8: CDF of shop start date of the identified Taobao sellers.
s tart date for the 4,109 identified sellers. The plot shows tha t about 70% of those 
sellers opened their stores after August 2011, within 2.5 years; 50% of stores have 
an age of no more than 1.5 years; 25% of stores were opened for less than half a 
year. This indicates that SEE markets are more popular among new sellers since 
they usually have a stronger desire to improve their stores’ reputation.
M ain Business. Each Taobao store has one main business. The 4,109 identified 
stores fall into nine categories based on their main businesses. Figure 3.9 shows the 
top 5 main businesses, which accounts for 69.7% of the 4,109 stores. Specifically, 
nearly 40% of stores sell clothing and accessories, which conforms to the fact that 
apparel is the most popular buying category on Taobao marketplace. About 10% 
of stores sell game and phone cards.
Store R eputations. We studied the distribution of the store reputations of 
the 4,109 identified Taobao sellers when they were observed to use SRE services 
at the first time. In Table 3.11, reputation scores are divided into specific ranges 
corresponding to various grades specified by the Taobao marketplace. For instance, 
a Taobao seller with a reputation score between 251 and 500 has a grade of one 
diamond. A reputation score between 501 and 1,000 corresponds to a grade of two
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Figure 3.9: Top 5 main businesses run by the 4,109 Taobao sellers.
diamonds. More details about the Taobao reputation grades are described in Table
3.14 in Section 3.4. Table 3.11 shows that most of the 4,109 sellers have small 
reputation scores. About 50% of those sellers have reputation scores less than 251, 
and about 80% have reputation scores less than 1,001. The result is reasonable since 
it is pursuing a high reputation score tha t formulates the motivation to use SRE 
services for most Taobao sellers.
R eputation R ange 0-250 251-500 501-1,000 1,001-2,000 2,001-
’ Percentage 51.1% 15.5% 12.9% 9.0% 11.6% '
Table 3.11: Distribution of the reputation scores of the 4,109 identified Taobao 
sellers at the inception of using SRE services.
A ctive D uration. We crawled the 11,130 sellers’ profiles on SRE markets. 
However, only the COOL market provides the consistent and correct information, 
while the other SRE markets have shown strange variation in sellers’ profiles over 
time. For instance, the total number of tasks posted by a seller on those markets 
does not monotonically increase over time but fluctuates irregularly. Thus, we only 
consider the profile dataset crawled from the COOL market. A seller is considered 
to be active throughout the period from her first posted task to the last one. The 
length of this time period is counted as the seller’s active duration on the market. 
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market. About 57% of sellers stay active on the COOL market for more than 100 
days, 40% for more than 200 days, and about 2% for more than 500 days. Based on 
the articles on the COOL market and Whois query results, we conjecture that the 
COOL market was founded on August 2012. Our results imply that most sellers on 
the COOL market may post tasks for several months or years, and a small portion 
have remained active since shortly after the market was formed.
D aily  Tasks P o s te d  p e r  Seller. We also investigate how many tasks a seller 
posts daily. Figure 3.11 shows the number of tasks posted daily per active seller 
on the five SRE markets during the two months we crawled. It is obvious that the 
sellers on the SKY market are most active, with 4.2 tasks posted daily on average 
per seller, while the sellers on the NET market are least active, with an average of 
2.2 tasks posted daily per seller. The parameter—the number of tasks posted daily 
per active seller—shows low variation over time for all markets except that it is 
quite low for COOL and NET markets a t the end of February and at the beginning 
of March. The reason is that the authentication cookies of these two markets expire 
so quickly that we didn’t realize the problem a t first and thus missed many newly
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Figure 3.11: Tasks posted daily per active seller on SRE markets over time. Num­
bers in parentheses in the legend denote the mean values of the number of tasks 
posted daily per active seller on each SRE market during our crawl interval.
posted tasks.
3.3.5 Worker Characteristics
The only publicly accessible data about workers on each market is a list of the top 
10 workers. In addition, only the COOL market provides consistently reasonable 
profile information. For instance, all the SRE markets but COOL set the first time 
of sellers to post tasks to be January 1, 2014. Thus, we use the 55 unique workers 
appearing in the top 10 worker list on the COOL market for analysis.
We examine their active durations, average tasks undertaken daily, and average 
daily earnings. We compute average daily earnings by multiplying average tasks 
undertaken daily by 80% of average commission fee per task (because 20% of com­
mission fee is withheld by the market). Figure 3.12(a) plots the CDF of the active 
durations for the 55 workers on the COOL market. The active duration of a worker 




Figure 3.12: (a) CDF of active duration of the top workers on the COOL market.
(b) CDF of average tasks undertaken daily by the top workers on the COOL market.
(c) CDF of average daily earnings of the top workers on the COOL market.
CDF plot shows that about 70% of workers have been active for more than 100 
days, about 30% of workers for more than 300 days, and about 2% for more than 
500 days, which demonstrates that the top workers could remain active on the mar­
kets for several years. Figure 3.12(b) shows the CDF of average tasks undertaken 
daily by the top workers. About 40% of workers undertake more than 5 tasks daily, 
about 25% undertake more than 10 tasks daily, and about 10% undertake more 
than 20 tasks daily. It takes about 5 minutes to undertake a task as revealed by 
the chat contents on SRE markets. Thus, nearly all workers only spend less than 2 
hours in taking tasks on SRE markets, which implies that most workers may take 
tasks only in their spare time. We do not have statistics about the demographics 
of workers, but close monitoring of the IM chat groups on each market reveals that 
most workers are college students, housewives, and freelancers. Figure 3.12(c) shows 
the CDF of average daily earnings of the 55 workers on the COOL market. More 
than one third can earn more than $2 daily, and about 5% earn more than $7 daily. 
The daily earnings seems quite low, but it is still attractive considering that the 
completion of a task only costs about 5 minutes, and the per capita daily income 
for a Chinese person is about $16 according to the World Bank statistics [39],
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3.3.6 Estim ating Revenue and Fake-Transact ion Volume
We estimate how much revenue these five SRE markets generated and how large 
of a transaction volume they handled during the two-mo nth period we monitored. 
The revenue generated by each market consists of the withheld commission fee from 
task postings on that market and the earnings from express tracking label sales. 
For each task, SRE markets withhold 20% of the associated commission fee. And 
for each physical goods, the corresponding seller needs to purchase from the SRE 
market one express tracking label to complete the transaction. Each express tracking 
label is charged at a price of $0.4-0.7 depending on the shipment company. SRE 
markets cooperate with shipment companies to provide tracking labels for sale. We 
do not know how they split the revenue from each sold tracking label and assume 
a 50/50 basis. Thus, the revenue generated by a market could be calculated based 
on the formula: 20% x CPT x (total task number) +  50% x label price x (total 
physical tasks), where CPT denotes the average commission fee per task, ranging 
from $0.28 to $0.38 depending on the five markets. In addition, we calculate the 
fake-transaction volume handled by an SRE market by adding together the goods’ 
value in each task we crawled over the course of two months. This metric reflects 
the total value of fake transactions conducted through SRE markets during our 
observation time period.
SKY WOOD EM PIRE COOL NET
Revenue(S) 11,805 12,369 9,938 9,189 3,137
Trans. Vol.($) 815,130 1,121,700 674,300 714,730 126,670
CPT($) 0.32 0.32 0.28 0.38 0.30
#  tasks 63,343 54,824 48,120 39,823 13,055
#  phys. tasks 38,753 44,301 36,216 30,811 11,768
Label price($) 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
T able 3.12: Estimated revenue and transaction volume
Based on the two-month crawled data, Table 3.12 lists our estimation of the
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revenue generated and the fake transaction volume handled by each market during 
the two months, along with the parameters involved in the formula for calculating 
revenue. We estimate th a t WOOD generated a revenue of at least $12,369 during the 
two months. SKY, EMPIRE, and COOL all generated more than $9,000 revenue. 
The revenue generated by NET is slightly more than $3,000. One main reason for 
the relatively low revenue of NET is that our crawler missed a large portion of task 
postings due to the quick cookie expiration. Based on the statistics for the COOL 
market, we estimate th a t its annual revenue will be more than $74,000. Note that 
we did not catch all the task postings on SRE markets, and all five SRE markets 
simultaneously profit from a variety of other services like selling Taobao accounts 
and the TRUSTEE service (we will introduce this in Section 3.4). Therefore, the 
estimated results likely represent only a lower bound of their overall revenues.
We estimate that the fake transaction volume handled by each market is enor­
mous. For instance, the COOL market handled at least $1,121,700 during the two 
months, and it is estimated to handle the annual transaction volume of more than 
$6,700,000. The operators of SRE markets accumulate such a large amount of wealth 
in a short time, and they may make off with money that sellers and workers deposit 
into the markets. Actually, at least two SRE markets have been reported to make off 
with millions of dollars, and the involved sellers and workers suffer heavy financial 
losses [43, 44],
3.4 E ffectiveness o f SR E  services
In this section, we first evaluate the effectiveness of a typical SRE service requiring 
sellers to post tasks on SRE markets. Then, we present a more worrisome service 
newly launched by one SRE market and evaluate its effectiveness.
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3.4.1 Effect of Posting Tasks on SRE Market
By manually undertaking tasks for one month, we identified 4,109 unique Taobao 
sellers, denoted as “EVIL” sellers. One interesting question is whether posting 
tasks on SRE markets could indeed improve sellers’ reputations on Taobao. Or, can 
a seller using SRE services increase her store reputation remarkably faster than a 
fellow Taobao seller who has the same store age, sells the same categories of goods, 
but does not use SRE services? To address this question, we randomly selected 
4,000 legitimate Taobao sellers who follow the same distribution of store ages and 
main businesses as those 4,109 SRE sellers. We denote these random sellers as 
“BENI” , standing for benign sellers, which is arguably a fine assumption since the 
possibility that a randomly selected Taobao seller performs fake transactions on the 
SRE markets is extremely small considering the order of magnitude of active sellers 
on Taobao. We compare the two groups’ growth curves in their store reputations 
to evaluate the effectiveness of SRE services.
S et 1 2 3 4  5 6
Store age < lm  <2m  <3m <6m  < ly  <2y
T able 3.13: The store ages based on which we partition EVIL and BENI sellers. 
“< lm ” denotes a store age of less than 1 month while “< ly ” denotes less than 1 
year.
We argue that only the comparison in reputation growth between the two stores 
with similar ages and selling the same category of goods makes sense. Thus, for 
the two groups of sellers, EVIL and BENI, we only consider those selling clothing 
and accessories (the most popular business run by the Taobao sellers identified to 
be using SRE services, see Figure 3.9). We further partition each group into six sets 
based on store age. Table 3.13 enumerates the store ages used for partition. We 
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F ig u re  3.13: Comparison of the reputation growth distribution between BENI and 
EVIL stores with varying store ages over the course of one month.
majority of Taobao sellers on SRE markets (see Figure 3.8).
In Figure 3.13, we use boxplots to compare the distribution of reputation growth 
across one month between EVIL stores and BENI stores with varying store ages. 
Note that for each box, its bottom corresponds to the reputation increase of the 
Taobao seller on the 25th percentile, its top corresponds to that of the seller on the 
75th percentile, and the line across the box corresponds to that of the seller in the 
median.
These boxplots clearly show that the reputations of EVIL stores increase much 
faster than those of BENI stores, regardless of the store age and time interval. 
Within one week, EVIL stores increase their reputation scores by a median value 
(represented by the median line of each magenta box) of 6 to 8 , and by a median 
value of 22 to 30 within four weeks. The top 25% of EVIL stores (represented by the
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whiskers on top of magenta boxes) increase their reputation scores by 14 to 18 at 
least (depending on store ages) within one week, and by 50 to 82 at least within one 
month. In contrast, the reputation scores of BENI stores with different store ages 
increase at a much slower rate. The median line of each blue box representing BENI 
stores overlaps with the x  axis, implying that the median increase in reputation 
scores of BENI stores with different store ages is zero. It indicates that about 50% 
of BENI stores have not completed any transactions during the entire month. In 
addition, the top 25% of BENI stores (represented by the whiskers on top of the 
blue boxes) increase their reputation scores by 1 at least within one week and by 5 
to 8 a t least within one month, which is merely one-tenth of the reputation increase 
of the top 25% EVIL stores within one month. For all six kinds of store ages, 
the reputation increase of EVIL stores within one week (represented by the first 
magenta box in each subplot) is much larger than that of BENI stores within one 
month (represented by the last blue box in each subplot).
In summary, Taobao stores can remarkably increase their reputation scores by 
posting tasks on SRE markets, achieving higher ratings up to 10 times faster than 
legitimate stores. Actually, the effectiveness of SRE services is directly related to the 
Taobao’s reputation computation method, which could be boiled down to one sen­
tence that a Taobao seller earns one reputation score for each completed transaction 
with good ratings. And the three main inputs to the Taobao’s reputation compu­
tation method—transaction volumes, product ratings, and customer reviews—are 
exactly what an unscrupulous seller gains from fake-purchase activities conducted 
through SRE markets.
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3.4.2 An Emerging Service and Its Effectiveness
A new service was launched by the EMPIRE market on March 7, 2014. Different 
from the typical SRE service discussed above, this service does not require sellers 
to post tasks but demands full control of sellers’ Taobao stores during the service 
time. The market operator does not disclose how this service is implemented but 
guarantees to increase sellers’ reputation scores by up to 10,000 within several days. 
This service is quite attractive, since a legitimate seller may need several years to 
achieve the same reputation level, and even an insincere seller must tediously post 
about 10,000 tasks on SRE markets. We refer to this service as the TRUSTEE  
service.
D esired  G rade R ep u ta tion  A Fee (U S D ) D ays
1 diamond 251 96 3
2 diamonds 501 192 5
3 diamonds 1,001 384 7
4 diamonds 2,001 720 9
5 diamonds 5,001 1,200 11
1 crown 10,001 2,080 13
T able  3.14: TRUSTEE service expense standard: list of desired Taobao grade, 
corresponding reputation score increase, charged fees, and days needed to complete.
Table 3.14 presents the expense standard of the TRUSTEE service. The charged 
fees vary with desired Taobao grades3. According to the expense standard, a seller 
can obtain a diamond grade (i.e., increasing reputation by 251) within 3 days at 
the cost of $96 while gaining a crown grade (i.e., increasing reputation by 10,001) 
requires $2,080 and 13 days.
We crawled the EMPIRE market once daily for the list of customers who pur­
chased this service from March 9, 2014 to April 21, 2014 and collected 108 Taobao
sellers using this service. However, their Taobao IDs are not included in the crawled
3Taobao sellers have twenty grades going from one to five hearts, then one to five diamonds, 
then one to five crowns, and lastly one to five golden crowns. Taobao sellers need a specific number 
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F ig u re  3.14: Reputation changes over time for the 12 Taobao sellers identified to 
use TRUSTEE service.
data and cannot be recognized by manually undertaking tasks, due to no task post­
ings from those sellers. To reveal their Taobao IDs, we leverage one observation 
that some Taobao sellers use their Taobao IDs as their SRE account names. Thus, 
we crawled the Taobao marketplace and examined whether a Taobao store whose 
ID matches an existing SRE account. In this way, we successfully identified the 
Taobao IDs for 12 sellers. Subsequently, we performed daily crawling of these stores 
on Taobao to monitor their reputation changes.
Figure 3.14 shows the dynamics of the reputation scores of these 12 sellers, 
denoted as S1-S12, during and after their use of the TRUSTEE service. Each 
subplot depicts one seller’s reputation change. In each subplot, a steep increase 
corresponds to one use of the TRUSTEE service. We make several observations 
from this figure. First, the use of the TRUSTEE service can significantly increase 
sellers’ store reputation by a desired amount. We observed that each of these 12
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sellers increased their reputation scores after receiving the TRUSTEE service by 
251 or 1,001, corresponding to one diamond and three diamonds in Table 3.14, 
respectively. Second, some sellers may use the TRUSTEE service more than once. 
For instance, seller Si used the TRUSTEE service twice within two weeks and 
requested an increase of 251 each time. Third, each request for the TRUSTEE 
service can be fulfilled within one day. Note that seller S3 requested an increase 
of 1,001 in reputation and was also satisfied within one day. Forth, it seems that 
the TRUSTEE service cannot guarantee a continuous increase in reputation nor an 
instant increase in sales. For each seller, the curve remains flat in the following 10 to 
15 days after using the service. Fifth, only two sellers were observed to be penalized 
by Taobao. The reputation scores of two sellers S9 and S12 were reduced to zero 
in 7 to 10 days after their use of the TRUSTEE service. We conjecture that the 
two sellers were penalized by Taobao for their reputation manipulation. Lastly, four 
of those 12 Taobao stores using the service were newly opened within the past six 
months. Especially, two stores began using the service just a few days after their 
opening. It seems that this service is quite popular among new Taobao stores.
3.5 P oten tia l M itiga tion  S trateg ies and L im ita­
tion
Although reputation manipulation is known for a long time in e-commerce, there is 
no open literature studying this specific SRE problem and we are the first to term 
the SRE markets and investigate them. Existing attacks against reputation systems 
include self-promoting, whitewashing, slandering, orchestrated attack, and DoS at­
tack [45]. Compared to those known attacks, the newly emerging SRE problem is
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much more sophisticated in three aspects: (1) much more organized (in the form 
of crowdsourcing), (2) much more severe (about tens of thousands of sellers and 
workers are involved during a short window of two months), and (3) much harder to 
detect (SRE market operators have formulated elaborate strategies for each step in­
volved in a purchase transaction). In addition, our study shows th a t only 2.2% of the 
fraudulent sellers were detected, indicating that the Taobao’s existing proprietary 
fake-transaction detection mechanisms fail in the face of the SRE problem.
Moreover, we believe that most existing detection mechanisms are vulnerable 
to SRE reputation escalation because the existing detection mechanisms do not 
consider the factor of shipping. In fact, whether the ordered products are delivered 
or not is the only difference between fake purchases conducted through SRE markets 
and real purchases.
We realize th a t the booming SRE business depends on four components: a highly 
available website to connect Taobao sellers and workers; express mail tracking labels 
sold to sellers; Taobao buyer accounts sold to task workers; and an escrow mecha­
nism to resolve disputes between sellers and workers. Accordingly, defenders could 
develop a set of intervention approaches.
D om ain R egistrar and W eb H osting. If registrars were to suspend SRE 
markets’ domains and web hosting service providers were to take down SRE market 
sites, the business of SRE markets would be interrupted immediately. We note that 
even temporary unavailability of SRE sites causes panic among involved sellers and 
workers greatly since they worry about their deposits on the SRE markets.
Shipping. Taobao could identify the shipment companies colluding with SRE 
markets and pressure them to terminate the cooperation. In addition, Taobao could 
collaborate with shipment companies to identify fake tracking numbers.
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Taobao A ccounts. To undertake tasks, a professional worker may need tens 
of Taobao accounts. Taobao accounts on SRE markets serve as the essential tools 
to conduct fake transactions, which highlights the need for Taobao account abuse 
detection at registration time.
Escrow Service Provided by SR E M arkets. Escrow services used by SRE 
markets are all based on Alipay, the escrow system provided by Taobao. Actually, 
each SRE market operator has a publicly visible Alipay account to accept the money 
from a seller before posting tasks and to release money to task workers after the 
completion of tasks. Thus, suspending Alipay accounts used by SRE markets would 
dramatically demonetize the underlying enterprise.
In addition, by targeting SRE markets’ evasion strategies revealed in this work, 
Taobao can further improve its current detection mechanism. A high risk of being 
penalized for fake transactions would cause Taobao sellers to abandon SRE services. 
In addition, the especially high popularity of SRE markets with new Taobao stores 
indicates that some measures should be taken by online marketplaces to help new 
stores to promote without hurting the fairness to established stores.
Lim itations. Here we clarify the limitations of our study. First, we only inves­
tigated the SRE markets catering to online sellers from the Taobao marketplace in 
our study, although there indeed exist several other SRE markets targeting other 
Chinese marketplaces such as JD.com [40]. Taobao is much larger than the rest 
of the online marketplaces in China and even larger than Amazon and eBay. We 
believe that the SRE markets we studied are representative of the current SRE in­
dustry. In addition, our study sounds an alarm for other major online marketplaces, 
indicating that they may also suffer the same problem of fake transactions.
Second, there exist limitations in our dataset. Our crawler failed to catch all
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task postings during the two months we monitored, due to unexpected network 
connection failures or expired authentication cookies. Thus, our evaluation results 
only represent a lower bound. Moreover, we cannot collect much more information 
about workers due to a limited amount of data available. Specifically, a list of the 
top 10 workers periodically updated is all the data related to workers and publicly 
available on an SRE market. Furthermore, some crawled data turned out to be 
unreasonable and was discarded. For instance, all the SRE markets but COOL set 
the first time of sellers to post tasks to be January 1 , 2014. Only the COOL market 
provides consistently reasonable seller profile information. Thus, we only use the 
profile dataset crawled on the COOL market for analysis.
Finally, we did not implement a robust fake-purchase detection mechanism for 
evaluating our proposed intervention approaches, which requires the deployment 
cooperation from Taobao. We leave the defense evaluation for our future work.
3.6 R ev isit th e  SR E  E cosystem  O ne Year Later
Since the spring 2014, the problem of fake transactions in the e-commerce ecosystem 
has attracted wide attention from the public, industry, and research communities. 
Thus, we revisit the SRE markets infiltrated one year ago, including the involved 
Taobao sellers, to examine the possible changes in the SRE ecosystem.
Among the five SRE markets we infiltrated, EMPIRE is found to have been shut 
down by some law enforcement agencies. Another SRE market, NET, cannot be 
accessed by us due to the account/password loss. Thus, during a time period of 
40 days from April 16, 2015 to May 26, 2015, we performed continuous crawling 
of the remaining three SRE markets — SKY, WOOD, and COOL — for newly 
posted tasks, and crawled the Taobao marketplace once daily for the reputation
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scores of the 3,221 SRE sellers who posted tasks on the three SRE markets and had 
their Taobao IDs identified by us in 2014. For the convenience of illustration, we 
continue to use EVIL  to denote those 3,221 SRE stores as we did for the 4,109 ones 
in Section 3.4. For the BENI  stores mentioned in Section 3.4, we examined their 
current statuses (e.g., shut down or still open) and compared the reputation growth 
across one year between the BENI  stores and the EVIL ones.
W ith the collected data set, we attem pt to answer the following questions: (1) 
are the SRE markets still so dynamic as they were a year ago? (2) are the 11,130 
SRE sellers observed to post tasks last year still posting tasks on the SRE markets? 
(3) how do the reputation scores of the 3,221 SRE stores grow in the past one year? 
and (4) is the reputation growth curve of the EVIL  stores different from that of the 
BENI  ones, and how?
3.6.1 Current Statuses o f SRE M arkets
By continuously crawling the three SRE markets for a time period of 40 days from 
April 16, 2015 to May 26, 2015, we evaluate the current dynamism of the SRE 
markets and attem pt to spot any changes in their popularity across one year.
Table 3.15 summarizes the dataset we crawled on the three SRE markets. Specifi­
cally, we collected 31,997 fake-transaction tasks in total, contributed by 2,687 unique 
Taobao sellers. Each day, up to 794 new tasks were posted on an SRE market, and 
up to 297 sellers were observed to post tasks on a market.
We made a comparison between the dynamism of the three SRE markets in 
2015 and th a t of the same SRE markets about a year ago. Table 3.16 details the 
comparison results, showing that the three SRE markets are not as active as they 
were a year ago. Specifically, compared to the results in 2014, we observed evident
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Market Total tasks Total sellers D aily new tasks (max) Daily active sellers (max)
SKY 9,035 683 457 162 '
WOOD 11,449 904 669 262
COOL 11,513 1,100 794 297
Total 31,997 2,687 - -
T ab le  3.15: Statistics of total task postings, total active sellers, maximum daily 
new tasks, and maximum daily active sellers on the three SRE markets during 40 
days.
decrements in the three metrics — daily new tasks, daily active sellers, and daily 
tasks posted per seller. On the three SRE markets, the average number of daily new 
tasks falls by 42.1% to 68.3%; the average population of daily active sellers falls by 
36.1% to 54.9%; and the average number of daily tasks per seller falls by 12.5% to 
40.5%. We speculate that the widespread concern over the e-commerce reputation 
manipulation problem and much more effective countermeasures taken by Taobao 
since last year have contributed to the dramatic decline in activities on the SRE 
markets.
i D aily new tasks Daily active sell- D aily tasks per
j j (avg.) ers (avg.) ; seller (avg.)
M arket 2015 2014 rate 2015 2014 rate 2015 2014 rate
SKY 301 951 4-68.3%' 101 224 454.9%' 2.5 4.2 440.5%
. WOOD: 382 816 453.2% 138 297 453.5% 2.3 2.7 414.8%
COOL 384 663 442.1% 149 233 436.1% 2.1 2.4 412.5%
T able  3.16: Variation of the dynamism of the three SRE markets in the past one 
year.
3.6.2 Current A ctivities of SRE Sellers on SRE M arkets
During the two months from February 2014 to April 2014, we observed 8,473 SRE 
sellers ever posting tasks on the SKY, WOOD, and COOL markets. Note that there 
are 3,221 out of the 8,473 sellers, for which we were able to identify their Taobao 
IDs by manually undertaking tasks.
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We revisited the three SRE markets to examine how many of the 8,473 sellers
previously captured are still active on the SRE markets and then monitor their
task posting activities. Table 3.17 lists the number of sellers still active on each
SRE market, the percentage of them in the 8,473 sellers, and the percentage they
represent in these sellers currently active in 2015. It shows that in total 559 SRE
sellers observed last year were still posting tasks on the SRE markets during the 40
days we monitored this year. They represent 6.6% of the 8,473 sellers and 20.8% of
the 2,687 SRE sellers currently active on the three SRE markets.
Market #  o f  8,473 sellers % o f 8,473 sellers occupy % in cur-
still active still active rently active sellers
SKY 89 " ' 3.2% (89/2,789) ' 13.0% (89/683)
WOOD ! 221 7.4% (221/2,968) 24.4% (221/904)
, COOL : 249 9.2% (249/2,716) 22.6% (249/1,100)
Total 559 6.6% (559/8,473) ; 20.8% (559/2,687)
T able 3.17: Current status of the 8,473 sellers on the SRE markets.
We then analyzed how active these 559 sellers were on the SRE markets in 2015 in 
terms of the number of task postings per active seller per day. Each seller was found 
to post 2.2 tasks each day on average and the median was 1.75. Then we compared 
these results in 2015 to those in 2014 for the same set of 559 active sellers. Figure
3.15 shows the comparison, indicating th a t the number of task postings per active 
seller per day in 2015 is similar to that in 2014, with just a slight decrease.
3.6.3 Current Statuses of the EVIL Taobao Stores on the
Taobao M arketplace
Based on the information returned by Taobao upon our crawling for the profiles of 
the 3,221 EVIL  stores, we disclosed those stores’ current statuses. Specifically, a 
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F ig u re  3.15: CDF of task postings per active seller per day in 2015 v.s. that in 
2014
formation showing that the store does not exist during the 40 days we monitored; 
otherwise, a store is considered active on the Taobao marketplace if its profile infor­
mation could be normally retrieved. In addition, for the purpose of comparison, we 
performed the same operations for the 4,000 BENI  stores and unveiled their current 
statuses.
Table 3.18 lists the statistics about the current statuses of both EVIL  and BENI  
Taobao stores. It shows that currently 83.3% of the EVIL  stores are active while 
16.7% are inaccessible, and for the BENI  stores, 87.8% are active and 12.2% axe 
inaccessible. The inaccessible ratio of the EVIL  stores is slightly higher than tha t of 
the BENI  ones. We also paid special attention to the 89 Taobao stores that suffered 
from heavy penalties (reputation zeroed or forcibly shut down) in 2014, and found 
that 47 of them are still inaccessible, which may indicate tha t more than a half of 
Taobao stores will not be reopened once reputation-zeroed or shut down.
82
3.6.3.1 R eputation  Growth o f the A ctive EVIL Stores A cross One Year
Since we stopped crawling the SRE markets during the time period from April 22, 
2014 to April 15, 2015, we cannot know whether the EVIL sellers continued posting 
tasks on the SRE markets during that period of time. However, it is still interesting 
to examine the difference between the 2,682 active EVIL stores and 3,512 active 
BENI  stores in their reputation growth in the past one year.
Similar to what we did in Section 3.4, we only considered those selling clothing 
and accessories in the two groups of EVIL  and BENI  stores. A store’s current 
reputation score does affect its future reputation growth over a long time period, 
like one year. Thus, based on a store’s reputation score on April 21, 2014 and 
the reputation grades defined by Taobao in Table 3.14, we partitioned each group 
of stores into four sets — “x<501,” “501<=x<l,001,” “l,001<=x<2,001,” and 
“x>=2,001.” We then compared the reputation growth curve between the two 
group of stores with similar reputation scores in 2014 and selling the same category 
of goods. Specifically, we compute the reputation increase as the difference between 
the reputation scores of 2015 and 2014, and then divide the reputation increase by 
the reputation score of 2014 to derive the reputation growth rate for each seller.
In Figures 3.16 and 3.17, we use boxplots to compare the distribution of reputa­
tion growth across one year, in terms of the reputation increase and the reputation 
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Figure 3.16: Comparison between cur- Figure 3.17: Comparison between cur­
rently active EVIL  and BENI  sellers in rently active EVIL  and BENI  sellers in 
terms of reputation increase across one terms of reputation growth rate across
year. one year.
The two figures clearly show that the reputations of EVIL stores increase faster 
than those of BENI  stores in both metrics — reputation increase and reputation 
growth rate — for the stores with all varying reputation grades except the grade 
set of “l,001<=x<2,001.” Take the stores with the reputation grade set of “<501” 
an an example, within one year, EVIL  stores increase their reputation scores by a 
median value of 129 and at a median rate of 100%, while BENI  stores only increase 
store reputations by a median value of 31 and at a median rate of 61%.
3.6.3.2 R easoning W hy EVIL Stores B ecom e Inaccessible Now
For the 539 currently inaccessible EVIL stores that were active at the end of our 
monitoring in April 2014, it is hard to tell whether each store was forcibly shut 
down by Taobao for conducting fake transactions or it just died a “natural death. 
This is because we have not continuously monitored their reputation changes in 
the past one year. However, we attem pt to uncover the hidden reasons why those 
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the two months we monitored last year from February 2014 to  April 2014. To make 
insightful findings, we took the 488 currently inaccessible BENI  stores as a control 
group with the assumption that each BENI  store underwent a “natural death.” The 
assumption is reasonable since there are millions of stores on Taobao and it is quite 
normal for a small proportion of stores to die naturally each year.
Specifically, for each of the 539 inaccessible EVIL  stores, we examined its monthly 
reputation increase, monthly reputation growth rate, and monthly completed trans­
action volumes from February 2014 to April 2014. We also did the same examination 
on the 488 currently inaccessible BENI  stores. We then compared the distributions 
of those three metrics between EVIL  stores and BENI  stores to spot the possible 
reasons for those EVIL  stores to become inaccessible now.
Figure 3.18 depicts the monthly reputation increase of the currently inaccessible 
BENI  stores during one month we monitored in 2014. It shows that more than 
60% BENI  stores did not increase their reputations at all within a whole month; 
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Figure 3.20: CDF of monthly reputa­
tion growth rate of the currently inac­
cessible BENI stores between 3/21/2014 
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Figure 3.21: CDF of monthly reputa­
tion growth rate of the currently inacces­
sible EVIL  stores between 2/21/2014 and 
4/21/2014.
assumption, the distribution depicted in Figure 3.18 could be regarded to represent 
the distribution of monthly reputation increase for typical Taobao stores which are 
to be “dying naturally.” More specifically, the figure indicates th a t most dying 
Taobao stores have nearly stopped or at least have difficulty in gaining business 
before a “natural death.” Figure 3.19 depicts the monthly reputation increase of 
the currently inaccessible EVIL  stores during the two months last year. It shows that 
about 95% of EVIL  stores achieved increase in their reputations within a month; 
60% increased their reputations by at least 15; and 30% by at least 45. These 
results demonstrate th a t those EVIL  stores showed great ability in gaining business 
in 2014, quite different from the performance th a t those BENI stores presented. 
This observation indicates that the currently inaccessible EVIL  stores were probably 
forcibly shut down by Taobao for fake transactions.
We also examined the monthly growth rate of reputation score in 2014 for both 
the currently inaccessible EVIL  stores and BENI stores. In Figure 3.20, it shows that 
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Figure 3.22: CDF of the monthly trans- Figure 3.23: CDF of the monthly trans­
action volumes completed by the cur- action volumes completed by the cur­
rently inaccessible BENI sellers in 2014. rently inaccessible EVIL  sellers in 2014.
Figure 3.21 shows that only less than 20% of the currently inaccessible EVIL  stores 
increased their reputations at a rate of zero, and more than 30% of those EVIL  
stores at least doubled their reputations within a month (i.e., at a growth rate of 
1). Thus, it is unlikely th a t those EVIL  stores died naturally when they were able 
to increase their reputations at such a large rate.
Lastly, we examined the monthly transaction volumes completed by both the 
currently inaccessible EVIL  stores and BENI stores in 2014. In Figure 3.22, it shows 
that more than 60% of the currently inaccessible BENI stores did not complete 
any transaction volume within a month and about 20% completed the transaction 
volumes of between 1 and 9. On the contrary, Figure 3.23 shows that only about 15% 
of the currently inaccessible EVIL  stores did not complete any transaction volume, 
and about 55% completed transaction volumes of more than 10. Again, those EVIL 
sellers seemed quite active in doing business on Taobao and unlikely closed their 
stores voluntarily in the following one year.
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3.6 .3 .3  S u m m ary
The above analysis of the currently inaccessible EVIL  stores, in terms of their rep­
utation changes and the completed transaction volumes during the two months we 
monitored last year, implies that it is probably the heavy penalties imposed by 
Taobao for fake transactions that causes those EVIL  stores to become inaccessible 
currently, rather than that they shut down the stores at their own choices.
3.6.4 Summary
By revisiting the SRE markets and the involved sellers one year later since our 
previous study, we first evaluated the current dynamism of the SRE markets and 
found that the SRE markets are not so active as they were one year ago. Then 
we examined the current activities of the involved sellers on the SRE markets and 
observed that only 6.6% of those sellers are still posting fake-transaction tasks. 
Finally, we scrutinized the current statuses of these ID-identified SRE stores on 
the Taobao marketplace and found that about 83% are active and 17% become 
inaccessible. With the randomly selected Taobao stores as a control group, we found 
that those active SRE stores increased their reputations faster than the random 
Taobao stores in the past one year. For the currently inaccessible SRE stores, we 
speculate tha t they probably suffered heavy penalties imposed by Taobao for their 
fake transactions during the past one year, which caused those stores to close down.
3.7  R ela ted  W ork
Over the past few years, many researchers have focused their studies on underground 
markets. Several works studied the underground economy related to Twitter, in­
eluding markets for selling fraudulent accounts [70, 71] and Twitter followers [65]. 
McCoy et al. examined the role of payment processing in the underground economy 
[57]. Motoyama et al. studied the social dynamics of underground forums [60] and 
investigated the market for CAPTCHA-solving services [59]. Franklin et al. [48] 
measured the commoditization of fraudulent activities on an underground market. 
Christin performed a similar measurement on Silk Road, an anonymous online mar­
ketplace [47]. Caballero et al. [46] and Grier et al. [49] studied the pay-per-install 
market and exploit-as-a-service model for malware distribution. In [52, 58], the au­
thors studied the markets for online pharmaceutical sales. Park et al. [64] leveraged 
magnetic honeypot ads to study Nigerian scams on Craigslist.
Our work is also related to previous studies on crowdsourcing marketplaces, 
which enable people (known as requesters) to coordinate the use of human intelli­
gence to perform tasks that computers are currently unable to do [42]. Since workers 
on crowdsourcing marketplaces can intentionally deliver low-quality work, Ipeirotis 
et al. presented an algorithm to estimate the quality of workers [51]. In addition, 
requesters may maliciously deny payment to workers. To address this problem, Ho 
et al. proposed the social-norms-based incentive mechanisms to augment crowd­
sourcing systems [50]. Crowdsourcing markets can also be employed for web service 
abuse. Miscreants could easily recruit a  large group of workers to solve CAPTCHAs 
[59], register a multitude of fraudulent OSN accounts, and send email spam [61], 
etc. Similarly, SRE markets also operate in the crowdsourcing model. However, 
SRE markets target special requesters, i.e., online sellers, and provide special ser­
vices, i.e., fake purchases on online shopping marketplaces.
Reputation systems are quite important to the e-commerce ecosystem. Several 
work [63, 54, 55, 56] investigated the online review manipulation and some others
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[62, 53, 66] proposed methods to detect deceptive opinion spam, i.e. fake reviews 
written to deliberately mislead readers. O tt et al. explored the prevalence of de­
ception in several popular online review communities [63]. Mayzlin et al. provided 
an empirical investigation of online review manipulation on two travel websites [54]. 
Chen et al. [69] conducted a real case study of opinion spams in a web forum. Nosko 
et al. discussed the limits of reputation mechanisms used in e-commerce markets 
[55]. Mukherjee et al. aimed to spot fake reviewers using behavior footprints [62]. 
Li et al. proposed a three-layer graph model to identify manipulated offerings on 
review portals [53]. Swamynathan et al. [66] proposed a reliable reputation system 
to address the attacks targeting reputation systems. Akoglu et al. proposed ap­
proaches th a t utilize network effect [67] or consider both the m etadata and network 
factors [68] for spotting fraudsters and fake reviews. In this study, we examined 
a newly emerging underground industry in which a potentially unbounded number 
of inexpensive human laborers are hired to conduct fake purchases for reputation 
inflation. This way of tainting the reputation system is more advanced and beyond 
the attacks known previously.
3.8 C onclusion
We have conducted the first systematic study of a seller-reputation-escalation (SRE) 
ecosystem by infiltrating five SRE markets. These markets specialize in accommo­
dating online marketplace sellers to post fake-purchase tasks for escalating their 
business reputations. We performed daily crawls for two months and observed that 
more than 11,000 online sellers posted nearly 220,000 tasks on the five SRE mar­
kets. Each new task could be undertaken within seconds. SRE markets turn out 
to be quite popular with online sellers. In addition, we examined the tactics for­
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mulated by SRE markets for evading the online marketplace defenders’ detection 
mechanism of fake transactions. Those tactics are so sophisticated that only about 
25% of illegitimate online sellers were visibly penalized for fake transaction. More­
over, we characterized the online sellers involved in fake transactions and discovered 
that most of them run new stores and mainly sell clothing or game cards on the 
online marketplace. Furthermore, we evaluated the effectiveness of SRE services 
and revealed that the illegitimate sellers using SRE services can increase their rep­
utations 10 times faster than legitimate ones. In addition, we investigated a newly 
launched SRE service and found that the service can increase sellers’ reputations by 
up to thousands within one day. We estimated that an SRE market can generate 
annual revenue of over $70,000 and handle annual fake-transaction volume of over 
$6,700,000. We also discussed possible intervention approaches and proposed that 
the joint interventions at the domain, web hosting, shipping, account registration, 
and payment tiers are probably the most viable defense strategy. Finally, we pre­
sented the findings from our revisiting of the SRE ecosystem one year later. We 
found that the SRE markets are not so active as they were and that about 17% 
of the 4,109 identified Taobao stores are inaccessible probably due to the heavy 
penalties imposed by Taobao for fake transactions.
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Chapter 4 
A ssessing Privacy Risks on Online 
P hotos
Online photo privacy, which we are trying to address, has become a great concern 
nowadays. In this work, we first conduct a large amount of measurement to exam­
ine the prevalence of m etadata and study the photo handling policies adopted by 
hundreds of top media sites. Then we demonstrate an important attack vector not 
exploited before and further propose an efficient re-identification attack.
To obtain a representative dataset for our study, we collected nearly 200,000 pho­
tos in total in various ways including soliciting freshly taken photos through crowd­
sourcing, downloading original sized, intact photos from a major photo sharing site, 
and crawling “wild” photos from Google Images and over 600 top ranked websites. 
We examined the m etadata information embedded in these photos and found that 
m etadata was prevalent among photos at each of the. three stages. We paid special 
attention to the m etadata fields that may give rise to great privacy concerns. We 
found that about 10% of “fresh” photos were tagged with GPS coordinates while 
27%-37% of “intact” photos and only about 1% of “wild” photos contained GPS
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information. We also measured the percentages of photos containing other sensitive 
m etadata information including a photographer’s name and modification history.
To understand how a photo is processed after being shared online, we also in­
vestigated online sites’ policies on handling photos based on 97,664 photos crawled 
from 679 unique top sites in seven categories— “social networking,” “news,” “we­
blog,” “college,” “government,” “shopping,” and “classified”1 sites. We found that 
photo handling policies adopted by online sites vary with different categories. The 
“college” and “government” sites hardly resize the photos they host or remove the 
embedded m etadata information. However, the sites in the other categories are 
more likely to resize the photos and remove the m etadata information. Finally, 
we proposed that the m etadata field camera serial number could be used as an 
attack vector. For 62.6% of unique photographers, we were able to uncover their 
both online and real-world identities with just one photo they ever took and posted 
online.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. We provide background 
knowledge in Section 4.1. We describe data collection methods for “fresh” photos 
and characterize them in Section 4.2. We examine “intact” photos in Section 4.3. 
We characterize “wild” photos and investigate online sites’ photo handling policies in 
Section 4.4. We demonstrate the re-identification attack in Section 4.5. We discuss 
the limitation of this work and propose our future work in Section 4.6. We survey 
the related work in Section 4.7 and conclude the chapter in Section 4.8.
' “Classified” refers to the classified advertisements sites such as Craigslist.
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4.1 Background
In this section, we first give an overview of the m etadata information typically 
contained in a digital photo, then discuss the potential privacy concerns, and finally 
illustrate the three stages we define for digital photos.
4.1.1 M etadata Inform ation in a Photo
There are three most commonly used m etadata standards for photos: EXIF, XMP, 
and IPTC. They often coexist in a photo and constitute the main part of the photo 
metadata. Table 4.1 lists the m etadata fields typically included in a photo grouped 
by category.
[ C a te g o ry ! In fo rm a tio n I F ie ld s
; When 
|" Where
i D ate Time 
j Location
' create tim e, modify time 
: GPS coordinates, c ity /s ta te /coun try
I How | Device Info. j cam era make, model, serial number, light source, expo- 
i sure mode, flash, aperture settings, ISO setting, shutter 
speed, focal length, color information
Who People a rtis t’s name
W hat Description title, headline, caption, by-line, keywords, copyright, 
special instructions
Modification Modification History create tool, xm p toolkit, history action, history when, 
history software agent, history param eters
T able 4.1: List of m etadata information typically included in a digital photo.
A digital photo typically contains ample m etadata information. When a shot is 
taken, the camera automatically embeds into the photo all the information it knows 
about the camera itself and the photo. In addition, users can add their own de­
scriptive information with image processing software. Specifically, typical metadata 
information can be summarized as follows: (1) when -  when the photo is created 
and modified if applicable, (2) where -  the exact location (GPS coordinates and 
altitude) at which the photo is captured if a GPS receiver is equipped and enabled, 
or coarse-grained location information such as city/state/country, (3) how -  the
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camera device used, its make, model, serial number, light circumstances (sunny 
or cloudy, flash on or off), exposure (auto or manual), and all other parameters 
used, (4) who -  the photographer and the people depicted in the photo if manually 
added during post processing, (5) what -  title, headline, caption, keywords, copy­
right restriction, and other detailed descriptions added for logging, organization or 
copyright protection, and (6) modification -  if the photo is modified, on what date 
and time, by what software on what computer, and the specific actions done to the 
photo.
4.1.2 Potential Privacy Concerns Arising from P hoto  M eta­
data
Most m etadata fields may look innocent and trivial. However, some could raise 
serious privacy concerns. We highlight several sensitive m etadata fields below.
G eolocation. Contemporary cameras and smartphones are typically equipped 
with GPS functions. When taking photos with these GPS-enabled devices, geolo­
cation information is automatically saved into the metadata. For a photo posted 
online, anybody able to access it could check the m etadata information and may 
get the geolocation where the photo was taken. This definitely violates the privacy 
of the photographer and the people depicted. For instance, the time and location 
embedded in an online photo indicated that a public figure had been at an embar­
rassing location and not where he claimed to have been [76]. Moreover, a geo-located 
photo obviously taken at home and depicting high-value goods may give burglars 
incentives. In addition, young parents usually like to post many photos of their 
kids online, which may raise great concerns because the photos tagged with GPS 
coordinates could disclose the exact locations of where their kids live, play, or study.
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Photographer’s /O w n er’s inform ation. Some photos explicitly contain in 
the m etadata the photographers’ information, among which the name information 
is most commonly seen. No m atter whether such information is embedded with 
or without the photographers’ awareness, disclosing such information may cause 
identity leakage, especially given the availability of geolocation information in the 
metadata.
M odification History. When post processing a digital photo, an image pro­
cessing software like Adobe Photoshop and Apple iPhoto often automatically embeds 
into the photo the detailed modification information, represented by three metadata 
fields: History When, History Software, and History Parameters. Table 4.2 presents 
an example of the embedded modification information in a photo. For the conve­
nience of illustration, we add the photo’s shot time in the table. It clearly shows 
that the photo has been processed twice in less than one month since it was taken 
on July 16, 2014. And two versions of Adobe Photoshop on one or two Macintosh 
computers were ever used for format conversion and save actions.
C reate  D a t e  ■ H istory  W h en
2014:07:16 15:13:56 T  2014:07:19 
i 01:30:03,
2014:08:08 21:17:25




toshop Lightroom 5.6 
(Macintosh)
H istory P aram eters
converted from image/x-
nikon-nef to image/dng,
saved to new location, con­
verted from im age/dng to 
image/jpeg, saved to new 
location
Table 4.2: An example of modification information contained in a photo’s meta­
data.
A photographer may not want to disclose such modification information, espe­
cially when such information may undermine what the photographer tries to convey 
through the photo. For instance, the contained modification information may cast 
doubt on the legitimacy of a photo used as digital photographic evidence in court. In 
addition, celebrities may not like the public to know the photos they were depicted
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in are actually photoshopped.
4.1.3 Three Stages of D igital Photos
Based on their propagation process, contemporary digital photos fall into three 
stages: “fresh,” “intact,” and “wild.” In the “fresh” stage, a  photo is freshly taken, 
free from any post-processing manipulations and still stored in the local camera 
device. All the m etadata information contained in a “fresh” photo is automatically 
embedded by the camera device, instead of being subsequently introduced by a post 
processing. In the “intact” stage, a photo has been uploaded online, but remains 
intact and has not yet been compressed or resized by the hosting media site. For a 
photo in the “wild” stage, it may have undergone resizing, cropping, and other editing 
actions conducted by the hosting site, which could change the hidden metadata too. 
By characterizing digital photos in these three different stages, we aim to depict the 
status of contemporary digital photos.
4.2 Fresh P h o to s
The photos in the “fresh” stage are just freshly created. We examine the metadata 
information, especially sensitive information, embedded in those freshly taken pho­
tos. In this section, we first describe the method used for collecting “fresh” photos 
and then characterize the collected photos.
4.2.1 D ata Collection
The collection of “fresh” photos is not easy due to their inherent characteristics. 
We found that it is an effective way to solicit “fresh” photos through crowdsourcing.
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We posted tasks on a crowdsourcing platform. In each task, the required actions 
for a worker to take are two-fold: (1) pick up her smartphone, take a photo, and 
then send the photo to us directly via the instrumented email client application, 
and (2) take a short survey asking for her demographics information. In addition, 
to guarantee the unique origin of each photo, each worker is allowed to take our task 
only once.
For each received photo, we employed various methods to check if it is freshly 
taken with a smartphone rather than a photo randomly grabbed from the Internet. 
In addition, according to our tests, sending a photo via email does not affect its 
embedded metadata. Thus, our task requirements guarantee that the collected 
photos are freshly created and intact from any post-processing manipulation. The 
data collection lasts for two months and we collected 782 photos in total. We filtered 
out 170 photos that are either post-processed or created by other tools. We use the 
set of the remaining 612 photos for our study.
4.2.2 Characterizing “Fresh” Photos
D em ograph ics. The 612 photos were collected from 612 unique workers from 76 
countries. Table 4.3 lists the demographic statistics of the worker participants: (1) 
71.7% of workers were male and the rest were female, (2) 45.5% of workers were from 
the top five countries, including India, United States, Serbia, Nepal, and Macedonia, 
(3) 82.1% of workers were between the ages of 18-34 and 10.8% between 35-44, (4) 
47% of workers received the bachelor’s degree, 33.3% with high school degree, and 
17.7% with graduate degree, and (5) 72.8% of photos were taken with Android 
phones and 18.2% with iOS phones.
(S ensitive) M e ta d a ta  P revalence . Although Table 4.1 lists quite a few meta-
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Figure 4.1: Percentage of “fresh” pho- Figure 4.2: Percentage of “fresh” pho­
tos containing m etadata information. tos tagged with GPS for smartphone OS.
data fields typically embedded in a photo, a specific photo often has a large portion 
of its m etadata information missing. According to our measurement results, we 
found tha t two m etadata fields, camera make and model, are the most fundamental 
metadata information. That is, if they are missing in a photo, most other metadata 
fields are missing too. Thus, we decide whether a photo contains m etadata informa­
tion based on these two fields. A photo is regarded as containing m etadata if either 
of the two fields has a non-empty value.
With the help of a third-party library [73], we examined the prevalence of meta­
data information among 612 “fresh” photos. We also examined if “fresh” photos 
contain any sensitive m etadata fields, including geolocation, owner’s information, 
and modification history, as mentioned in Section 4.1. Figure 4.1 shows the percent­
ages of photos containing m etadata and sensitive m etadata fields. As high as 86.4% 
of “fresh” photos contain m etadata, which demonstrates the prevalence of meta-
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data information among freshly taken digital photos. As of the sensitive metadata 
fields, 15% of fresh photos are tagged with geolocation information. The results 
show that although nearly all smartphones are now GPS-equipped, only some of 
them are GPS-enabled. The percentage is expected to be even lower if more people 
are aware that smartphones may automatically embed geolocation into photos and 
then choose to turn  the GPS functionality off. None or hardly any of “fresh” photos 
contain photographers’ information or modification history in their metadata. We 
speculate that it is due to (1) our strict task requirements and (2) the possibility that 
these two kinds of sensitive m etadata fields may not be automatically embedded at 
the time of a photo shot.
Im pact o f Sm artphone OS on G eolocation m etadata. It is interesting to 
examine which kind of smartphone OSes are more likely to automatically embed the 
sensitive geolocation information into photos. Figure 4.2 shows tha t about one third 
of iOS and Windows phones automatically embed geolocation into photos while only 
about 10% of Android and Blackberry phones do this.
4.3  In tact P h o to s
In the “intact” stage, photos have been posted online while retaining intact meta­
data information. From this perspective, “intact photos” could reflect the status of 
m etadata in digital photos at the time of being shared online. In this section, we 
describe our data collection method for “intact” photos and examine the embedded 
m etadata information in them.
100






Metadata Geolocation O w nerjnfo  Modification
F ig u re  4.3: Percentage of “intact” photos containing m etadata information. In 
each of four pairs of columns, the left black column represents Flick^p while the 
right gray Flick.6.
4.3.1 D ata Collection
To collect such photos, we crawled photos from Flickr, a large photo-sharing website, 
using its API with the download option of “original size,” which guarantees that the 
photos remain original and intact from the site. More specifically, we collected two 
sets of “intact” photos from Flickr. The first set denoted by Flickrjp contains 18,404 
photos exclusively taken with smartphones. Those photos were crawled from the 
Flickr group “Smartphone Photography” where all photos were taken with smart­
phones. The other set denoted by Flickr.6 contains 43,704 photos uploaded within 
six months from July 1, 2014 to December 31, 2014. Our further examination shows 
that 94.3% of the photos in Flickr.6 were taken with digital cameras.
4.3.2 M etadata Inform ation Em bedded
Similarly, we examined the percentage of “intact” photos containing m etadata in­
formation, especially sensitive m etadata fields. Figure 4.3 shows the percentages of 
“intact” photos containing m etadata and sensitive m etadata fields.
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It shows that intact photos in Flickr.p and Flickr.6 have quite high percent­
ages containing m etadata information, 76.4% and 94.1%, respectively. The results 
indicate that most digital photos taken with either digital cameras or smartphones 
contain m etadata when being uploaded online. In addition, 37.1% Flickr.p and 
27.2% Flickr-6 photos contain GPS information. Considering 15% of “fresh” pho­
tos tagged with geolocation, we speculate that some photo owners may embed GPS 
information into photos during post processing to better show their photographic 
works on Flickr. Moreover, up to 65.6% and 88.1% Flickr.p and Flickr.6 photos con­
tain the photographer information, which could pose a great risk of identity leakage 
to photo owners. Additionally, about a half of Flickr.6 photos contain modification 
information. Most photos in the set are taken with professional digital cameras and 
photo owners often show intense interest in refining their works with image process­
ing software. By contrast, a much lower percentage of Flickr.p photos taken with 
smartphones are modified.
4.4  W ild  P h otos
In the “wild” stage, most online photos have lingered on the Internet for a while and 
may have experienced multiple modifications by the hosting sites. In this section, 
we attem pt to figure out the metadata information remaining in the “wild” photos 
and explore how the top media sites handle the photos hosted on them.
4.4.1 D ata Collection
We employed two methods to collect “wild” photos. The first method is to randomly 
collect photos by Google Images Search. In the custom search control panel, we set
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the image type as photo, file type as JP G /JP E G  files, image size as larger than 
400*300, and the date range from January 1, 2012 until January 1, 2015. Nearly all 
digital photos are in JPEG  format. The specified image size can filter out most of 
graphs, drawings, and other non-photo images. In addition, we only focus on the 
photos posted online in the past three years. We totally collected 38,140 photos in 
this way and denoted them by Googlelmage.
Secondly, to investigate top media sites’ policies on handling photos, we need to 
obtain a representative set of media sites. Alexa categorizes millions of sites and 
defines a list of site categories [75], from which we selected seven categories, which are 
“social networking,” “weblog,” “news,” “college,” “government,” “classified,” and 
“shopping”. The reason why we chose them is that presumably the sites in these 
categories usually host large amounts of photos. Alexa provides for each category 
a list of the top 500 sites. We selected the top 100 sites for each category and thus 
we had 700 unique top ranked sites in total as our subject representative of online 
media sites.
Not every photo appearing on a site is hosted by the site. A photo is considered 
being hosted on a site only if its image URL has the same domain as the site URL. 
Only the photos hosted on a site are eligible to be used for studying the site’s polices. 
During our photo collection from each site, we only crawled the photos hosted on 
that site. Specifically, for each of the 700 sites, we attempted to crawl 1,000 photos 
that appeared online after January 1, 2012. Those photos are expected to reflect 
the photo policy used by the hosting site under an assumption that the site has 
not made significant changes to its photo handling policy in the recent years. Due 
to unexpected factors including network connection failure and access permission 
denied, we were able to crawl 97,664 photos from 679 unique sites. To ensure the
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representativeness of these photos, we filtered out the sites from which less than 10 
photos were collected. Finally, we had 97,403 photos for 611 unique sites as our 
dataset for the study, about 160 photos per site on average. This set of photos are 
denoted as TopSitesPhoto.
4.4.2 Ethical Consideration
In our study, we leveraged several methods to collect photos, including: (1) solic­
iting “fresh” photos from crowdsourcing workers, (2) crawling photos from Flickr 
using its API, (3) random Google Image Search, and (4) crawling top websites for 
limited amounts of photos. Note that our crowdsourcing study has been vetted 
and approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at our institution. During 
our photo collection, we did not receive any concerns or get warnings from those 
involved sites and did not interfere with their normal operations. In addition, with 
the collected photos, we anonymized the m etadata information embedded before 
using them for study. We strictly abide by the copyright licenses if present.
Figure 4.4 depicts the number of photos crawled from each site. It shows that 
about 80% of sites have over 60 photos crawled, about 35% of sites have over 120 
photos crawled, and about 20% have over 300 photos crawled. We crawled a maxi­
mum number of 1,026 photos for one site2.
4.4.3 M etadata Information Em bedded
Figure 4.5 shows the percentages of “wild” photos containing metadata, especially 
those sensitive m etadata fields. It shows that the percentages of “wild” photos con­
taining m etadata information in the sets Googlelmage and TopSitesPhoto are 41.5%
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and 40.4%, respectively, which are much smaller than that of “intact” photos (up 
to 94.1%). In addition, very few “wild” photos are tagged with GPS coordinates. 
In Googlelmage and TopSitesPhoto, the percentages are 0.6% and 1.8%, respec­
tively, smaller than those of “fresh” and “intact” photos. Moreover, only 13.2% 
of Googlelmage photos and 8.7% of TopSitesPhoto photos contain photographers’ 
identification information. About 25.4% of Googlelmage photos and 14.1% of Top­
SitesPhoto photos contain modification history information. These results imply 
tha t compared to “fresh” and “intact” photos, a considerable proportion of “wild” 
photos have their embedded m etadata stripped away.
4.4.4 Inferring Online S ites’ P hoto  Handling Policies
Based on TopSitesPhoto, we have built a set of photos for each of the 611 unique 
sites. We attem pt to infer a site’s photo handling policy by characterizing the photos 
collected from the site. Specifically, we aim to answer two questions about a site’s 
photo handling policy. One is whether the site resizes the photos it hosts, and 
the other is whether the site removes the m etadata information embedded in those 
photos.
W hether a site  resizes its hosted  photos? After upload, a photo is typically 
compressed and resized by the hosting site in several sizes. For instance, Instagram 
uses an image size of 640 pixels in width and 640 pixels in height for nearly all its 
hosted photos. More commonly, an online site confines a photo’s longest side length 
to a small set of values. Flickr resizes its photos in the following sizes: 100 pixels (on 
the longest side), 240 pixels, 800 pixels, 1600 pixels and so on [81]. Therefore, if the 
majority of photos hosted by a site have their longest side (width or height) lengths 










F ig u re  4.6: Percentage of sites estimated to resize their photos across the seven 
categories.
photos it hosts.
For each photo in our dataset, we retrieved its longest side length from its file 
information. About 2% of photos had no image size information available and were 
ruled out. Suppose “D D D D ” is the longest side length value that is observed most 
frequently on a site. We calculated the proportion of the photos on the site with 
their longest side length of the value “D D D D " . We then leveraged the proportion 
number to decide whether the site resizes its photos or not. If over 50% of photos 
on the site have the longest side length of “D D D D " , the site is considered to 
resize its photos. The argument is based on our observation that among more than 
40,000 photos downloaded from Flickr with “original size” option, only 3.47% have 
their longest side length of 1,600 pixels, while this length value occurs much more 
frequently for the photos that have been resized.
Figure 4.6 shows what percentage of sites that are regarded to resize the photos 
on their sites across the 7 categories. It is not surprising to see that only 3.0% 
of “College” sites and 10.5% “Government” sites have resized their photos, since
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colleges and governments usually have sufficient hosting resources to store high- 
resolution photos. About 36.7% of “News” sites are estimated to resize the photos 
they host. A close examination reveals th a t news sites often resize their photos to 
many different sizes, which thereby lowers the percentage of photos with a unique 
longest side length size. In reality, there are probably much more news sites that 
resize their photos. In each of the other four categories, “Social networking,” “We­
blog,” “Classified,” and “Shopping,” over 50% of sites have resized the photos they 
host. Th sites in those categories often contain large amounts of photos and resizing 
photos is an effective means to save valuable storage space. Irrespective of cate­
gories, at least one third of all sites in our dataset are regarded to resize the photos 
they host. Note that our results represent a lower bound of the percentage of sites 
that resize their photos.
W hether a site  strips out the m etadata inform ation em bedded in the  
photos it hosts? There is another issue people may be concerned about when they 
upload photos online. As mentioned before, we use two fields in the m etadata— 
camera make and model—to determine if the metadata information exists or not. 
For each site in our dataset, we calculated the percentage of its photos containing 
m etadata information. Note that a photo may have its m etadata information erased 
by its owner before posted online. Thus, our estimated percentage of online sites 
that strip out the m etadata information of the photos they host represents an upper 
bound.
Figure 4.7 shows the CDF of the percentage of photos containing m etadata 
information on each of the 611 sites in the seven categories. About 16% of sites 
have no photos containing m etadata information. It is highly probable that those 
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F ig u re  4.7: CDF of the percentage of photos containing metadata information on 
each site.
sites have at least half of their hosted photos containing m etadata information. We 
determine tha t a site adopts a policy of removing photo metadata information if 
no photos hosted by the site contain m etadata information; otherwise, the site is 
considered to preserve the m etadata information of photos it hosts.
Figure 4.8 shows the percentage of sites in each category which are estimated to 
preserve the m etadata information of photos they host. Again we found that the two 
categories “College” and “Government” present quite different statistical character­
istics in preserving the photo m etadata than the rest five categories. Specifically, 
98% of college sites and 93.7% of government sites are estimated to preserve the 
photo m etadata information. Combined with the above estimation results on a 
site’s photo resizing policy, we draw the conclusion that college and government 
sites seldom resize the photos they host or remove the embedded photo metadata 
information. In each of the other five categories, the proportions of the sites that 
preserve the photo m etadata information are between 40% and 60%, much lower 
than those of college and government sites. On average, up to 68.4% of the top sites
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F ig u re  4.8: Percentage of sites estimated to preserve the photo m etadata informa­
tion across the seven categories.
in the seven categories preserve the photo m etadata information, which suggests 
that a number of online photos may still have their m etadata information open to 
public access for years.
4.5 R e-Id en tifica tion  A ttack
Except the sensitive m etadata fields including geolocation, owner’s information, and 
modification history, other m etadata fields may appear relatively innocent. However, 
in this section, we demonstrate the feasibility of exploiting a trivial looking m etadata 
field for re-identification attack.
Even without the photographer information explicitly included, a photographer 
can still be identified based on even only one photo she ever took. This can happen 
through a new attack vector—the camera serial number field in the photo metadata. 
A camera serial number can uniquely identify a camera most of the time.3 All photos
3A serial number is unique within a camera brand. Combined with camera make and model, a
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taken with a same digital camera are supposed to have the same serial number if 
provided.4 In theory, a single photo with a camera serial number embedded could 
be used to trace other online photos taken with the same camera. Those photos 
together facilitate identifying the photographer.
We figured out that a public online database stolencamerafinder [74] could be 
leveraged to search for online photos tagged with a given camera serial number, 
although the online service was established to help find stolen cameras. For each 
given serial number, stolencamerafinder returns a list of online photos taken with 
the same camera, and for each photo provides the page URL where the photo is 
posted and the image URL linking to the photo.
Next, we do experiments to prove it quite easy to identify a photo owner with 
only one photo she ever shared online in the case that the photo has a camera serial 
number embedded. About 12% of the “wild” photos in the two sets Googlelmage and 
TopSitesPhoto were found to contain the serial number information. We randomly 
selected 2,000 unique serial numbers from them, then manually searched each serial 
number in the stolencamerafinder, and finally got back search results for 1,037 serial 
numbers in total. Note that not every camera serial number could get search results 
back. For those 1,037 serial numbers, by following the image URLs returned, we 
collected 38,140 photos that were posted on 4,712 unique websites. The photos 
collected for a specific serial number only represent a subset of all photos available 
online and tagged with the same serial number, due to the impossibility of finding 
all online photos with a given serial number.
Figure 4.9 shows the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the number of 
photos that a single serial number links to. About 30% of serial numbers link to
serial number can uniquely identify a camera.
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Figure 4.9: CDF of the number of photos returned by stolencam erafinder for a 
given serial number.
over 25 photos and about 10% link to over 100 photos. The average number of 
photos linked to a same serial number is 36.8, the median is 10, and the maximum 
is 923. W ith the considerable number of photos tagged with a same camera serial 
number, together with the page URLs where the photos are posted, and the photos 
already existing in the photo sets Googlelmage and TopSitesPhoto, we were able 
to set up a knowledge base for each serial number (tentatively a digital camera). 
The rich information available can evidently disclose much more privacy information 
about the camera owner than a single serial number itself. This demonstrates the 
potential of a camera serial number as an attractive attack vector for mounting 
privacy attacks.
Identifying a Photographer. The page URL and the page where a photo is 
posted can provide important clues to reveal a photographer’s online identity. For 
instance, the URL https://plus.google.com  /X Y Z /p h o to s  suggests that the photog­
rapher should have a Google+ [79] account with the ID of “XYZ” . Following the
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URL allows us to retrieve more information about the photographer, such as her 
real name, college attended, current employer, and photos posted on her account 
page. We have observed a great many such URL strings in our dataset with photog­
raphers’ online social networks (OSNs) account IDs embedded. The involved OSNs 
include but not limited to Flickr, Facebook [77], Twitter [78], Google-f, and 500px
[80]. A photographer may have her multiple OSN accounts disclosed in this way. 
Table 4.4 lists the information typically contained in an account profile of the five 
social networks mentioned above. It shows that an account profile typically contains 
demographics and other sensitive information including age, gender, education, oc­
cupation, living city, other OSN accounts, and much more. Once one OSN account 





j Tw itter 
[ Facebook
A ccou n t P rofile  In form ation
Name, Occupation, Living City, Hometown, Gender, Personal Web- 
site(s), Email, Joined Time, Biography, Age, Religion 
Name, Biography, Living City, Contact, other OSN accounts
Name, Gender, Living City, Colleges Attended, Current Employer, 
Work Experience
Name, Occupation, Living City, Telephone, Email, Personal Web- 
page(s). Joined Time, Photos and Videos, Tweets, Followings, Fol­
lowers and Favorites
Name, Living City, Gender, Education, Telephone, other OSN ac­
counts, Life Events
T able 4.4: List of the information typically contained in an account profile in each 
of the five OSNs. Note that the listed information represents the maximum amount 
of information available with public permissions of an OSN account.
Figure 4.10 shows the percentage of serial numbers from which we are able to 
identify the corresponding camera owners’ IDs in one or more OSNs by scrutinizing 
the page URLs where the photos were posted. Among the 1,037 unique serial 
numbers in our dataset, 51.4% (533) of the serial numbers have the camera owners’ 
OSN accounts identified, and 9.0% (93) have account IDs in two or more OSNs 
identified. And for one serial number we even identified the camera owner’s four 
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Figure 4.10: Percentage of camera serial numbers (SNs) with camera owners’ OSN 
accounts identified.
As mentioned before, we were able to retrieve about 37 online photos on average 
for a given serial number. Those photos tagged with the same serial number may 
contain m etadata information tha t could help identify the photographer. We closely 
examined the metadata information embedded in the related photos for each of the 
remaining 504 serial numbers without any OSN accounts identified in the previ­
ous step. Among them, we successfully identified the photographers for 116 serial 
numbers. Compared to the photographers with their OSN accounts identified, the 
available information on those 116 photographers are restricted to the photo meta­
data embedded, mainly including their names, the processing softwares, and OSes 
used. However, more information could be collected online once a person’s name 
is identified. Overall, 62.6% (649) of serial numbers have had their photographers 
identified.
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4.6  D iscu ssion
One goal of this work is to track the propagation of the sensitive m etadata informa­
tion embedded in the digital photos at different stages. One ideal way is to monitor 
the process of creation, modification, and elimination of the m etadata information 
contained in a same set of photos that sequentially experience three stages— “fresh,” 
“intact,” and “wild.” However, it is very hard to obtain such an ideal photo set in 
large-scale. Instead, we employed different data collection methods and obtained 
three kinds of photo sets to represent the digital photos at the corresponding three 
stages.
We collected 612 valid “fresh” photos through crowdsourcing in a period of two 
months. Each photo collected was taken by a unique participant with a unique 
device, and participants from 76 countries contributed to this dataset. In addition, 
those photos were solicited directly from smartphones and no photos taken with 
digital cameras were collected in order to avoid data contamination. Therefore, 
although the dataset size of “fresh” photos is not comparable to those of “intact” 
and “wild” photos, its representativeness is high enough for this study.
To infer online media sites’ policies on handling m etadata information in the 
photos they host, we adopt a passive approach, that is, by examining the metadata 
information of the photos collected from the sites. Actually, we once considered to 
take an active approach to detect media sites’ policies, by submitting (uploading) 
different types of photos to the sites, then re-downloading them, and comparing 
m etadata fields. However, we had to abandon this approach because most of the 
611 sites in the seven categories have specific user groups and are not open to public 
registration, not to mention photo uploading.
Although it is known that a camera serial number can uniquely identify a camera
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to some extent, we are not aware of any previous research work revealing potential 
threats arising from this attribute in an empirical and systematic manner. We 
demonstrated the feasibility of re-identification attack by exploiting camera serial 
number. We were able to identify over 60% of photo owners based on their camera 
serial numbers available in a public online database.
When a user shares a digital photo online, two questions about privacy issues are 
readily raised. One is whether sensitive hidden m etadata information is embedded 
in the photo. The other concerning question is what the media site will do with 
the photo. According to our experiment results, a considerable proportion of digital 
photos contain sensitive m etadata information, and many sites resize the photos they 
host or remove the embedded photo m etadata information. In our future work, we 
will develop a browser extension to give users direct answers to these two questions.
S e n s itiv e  M e ta d a ta P o te n t ia l  T h re a ts W e b s ite ’s P o licy
Geolocation Location disclosure, house robbery M etadata removing
Photographer’s Name Identity disclosure : Photo resizing
Modification History Undermining photo’s authenticity { NA t NACamera Serial Number Re-identification attack
Table 4.5: Main functions of the browser extension prototype
The major functions that the tool should have are illustrated in Table 4.5. Specif­
ically, once the sensitive m etadata information in a photo being uploaded is detected, 
the browser extension should issue an alarm by popping up a window on the screen 
and provide customized alert information, including the sensitive metadata infor­
mation embedded, the corresponding privacy risks, and the current visiting site’s 
policy on photo handling. Note that the browser extension should display the alert 
information only when the privacy-related m etadata information is detected, and 
thus it should not often interfere with normal photo upload workflows. Although 
there are already browser extensions for photo m etadata visualization, we will focus
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on informing users of the sensitive m etadata contained and customized privacy risks. 
Moreover, we will ensure users’ right to know the actions that the hosting media 
sites will perform on their photos.
4 .7  R ela ted  W ork
Several previous works conduct user studies to understand users’ privacy decisions 
during the photo sharing process and their privacy concerns on others’ photo-sharing 
activities. Clark et al. [82] revealed the problem of unintended photo storage without 
users’ awareness, which is mainly caused by the automatic features of cloud-based 
photo backup services. Ahern et al. [83] found that mobile users’ decisions to 
post photos privately or publicly were determined more by identity or impression 
concerns than security concerns. Besmer et al. [84] made similar findings. They 
studied users’ perception of being tagged in undesired photos uploaded by others. 
They found that a user’s privacy concerns on th a t domain were mainly related to 
identity and impression management within her existing social circles. Henne et al.
[85] showed in their survey results that among the information potentially disclosed 
by the tagged photos, personal references and location data raised most privacy 
concerns.
More related to our work, several researchers examined the privacy threat posed 
by the textual m etadata information contained in online photos. Friedland and 
Sommer [86] focused on the privacy threats posed by the geolocation information 
available online. They showed that the geolocation data  could be exploited to 
mount privacy attacks using three scenarios on Craigslist, Twitter, and YouTube, 
respectively. Pesce et al. [91] demonstrated that photo tagging on Facebook could be 
exploited to enhance prediction of users’ information like gender, city, and country.
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Another work from Mahmood and Desmedt [90] discussed possible privacy violations 
from Googled-’s policy that any users who access a photo can see its m etadata 
online. While the above three works addressed the privacy issues with photos, 
we investigated the privacy issues with online photos on a much larger scale. We 
assessed the privacy risks arising from leakage of all possible sensitive m etadata 
information rather than just geolocation data. Moreover, our study is not restricted 
to one media site. Instead, we collect our photo dataset from hundreds of top-ranked 
websites and through crowdsourcing platforms. Those photos cover various stages, 
i.e., “fresh,” “intact,” and “wild.” In addition, we introduce a new attack vector 
and show its unexpected power in conducting a re-identification attack. We also 
performed a large-scale measurement of photo handling policies adopted by various 
categories of media sites.
Another large body of previous work has attem pted to enhance people’s privacy 
when sharing photos online. Besmer et al. [96] designed a privacy enhancement 
tool to improve the photo tagging process on Facebook. The tool allows tagged 
users to negotiate online with the photo uploaders about the permission settings 
on the photo. Fang and LeFevre [92] built a machine learning model for OSN 
users to configure privacy settings automatically with a limited number of rules 
provided. Zerr et al. [97] developed privacy classification models for users to search 
for private photos about themselves posted by others at an early stage. Henne et 
al. [95] proposed a watchdog service that allows users to keep track of potentially 
harmful photos uploaded by others at the expense of sharing their location data with 
the service. Ra et al. [93] presented a selective encryption algorithm that enables a 
photo to hide its “secret” part from the host photo-sharing site and the unauthorized 
viewers and only expose its “public” part. Ilia et al. [94] refined the access control
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mechanism currently used by OSNs on photo sharing. The new mechanism allows 
the depicted users in a photo to decide the exposure of their own face, and could 
present photos with the restricted faces blurred out to a visitor. Complementary 
to those works attem pting to enhance privacy on the web server side, this study 
assesses the privacy risks arising from sensitive photo m etadata and provides some 
guidelines for developing client-side privacy leakage prevention tools, which should 
be able to alert online users of potential privacy risks posed by uploading photos and 
also inform them of the photo handling policies adopted by the currently visiting 
website.
To the best of our knowledge, we have conducted the first large-scale empirical 
measurement study of the status of contemporary digital photos at the three different 
stages. In addition to examining the sensitive m etadata information embedded, 
we inferred the photo handling policies used by hundreds of top-ranked sites, and 
proposed to exploit the camera identification number as an attack vector for re­
identification attack. We are not aware of any previous work studying these topics.
4.8  C onclusion
In this chapter, we performed a data-driven assessment of privacy risks on con­
temporary digital photos. We first collected from the Web nearly 200,000 digital 
photos a t three different stages as our dataset. Then for photos at each stage, we 
measured the prevalence of m etadata and assessed the privacy risks posed by meta­
data leakage. We found that m etadata is quite prevalent among digital photos at 
each stage. In particular, 15% of “fresh” photos, about 30% “intact” photos, and 
about 1% “wild” photos were tagged with GPS coordinates. The percentage of 
“wild” photos containing other sensitive m etadata information is also much lower
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than that of “intact” photos. A possible reason is that online sites often remove the 
m etadata information of the photos they host. Our speculation was confirmed by 
our investigation of photo handling policies based on nearly 100,000 photos crawled 
from 679 top sites in seven categories. We further found that photo policies used 
by a site vary with the category that the site belongs to. Finally, we proposed 
to use the camera serial number as a new attack vector towards privacy inference 
and demonstrated its power in deriving both online and real-world identities of a 
photographer with just one photo she ever took. In our future work, we will build 
a  browser extension prototype to prevent users’ photo privacy leakage and increase 
their knowledge of the online services’ policies on photo handling.
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Chapter 5
C onclusion and Future Work
Internet business is playing a more and more important role in the global economy. 
In this dissertation, we mainly focus on uncovering and detecting the fraudulent 
activities in two kinds of important Internet businesses, online advertising system 
and e-commerce system. In our first project, we proposed a novel ehallenge-response 
based detection mechanism for advertisers to independently detect fraudulent clicks 
on their advertisements without the help of either publishers or ad networks. We 
verified the effectiveness of the detection mechanism by deploying it in the real world. 
In our second project, we introduced a newly emerging threat to the e-commmerce 
reputation system. By infiltrating several underground markets providing the SRE 
(seller-reputation-escalation) service, we performed a deep analysis of the opera­
tional characteristics of those markets. We also investigated the effectiveness of 
SRE services and found that online sellers using SRE services can increase their 
store reputation 10 times faster than legitimate ones. In addition, e-commerce sites 
represent one kind of sites that are hit hardest by trash web traffic generated by bad 
bots. To assess the potential privacy risks arising from online photo sharing, in our 
third project, we performed a data-driven assessment of privacy risks on contempo­
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rary digital photos. We found that privacy sensitive m etadata information is quite 
prevalent among digital photos at each stage. We also proposed to use the camera 
serial number as a new attack vector towards privacy inference and demonstrated 
its power in deriving both online and real-world identities of a  photographer with 
just one photo she ever took.
The e-commerce business is increasingly thriving in the recent several years. In 
our future work, we will still focus our attention on the fake transaction problem 
that are greatly affecting the continuous development of e-commerce business. Our 
goal is to develop a practical fake transaction detection system for e-commerce 
marketplaces to identify a fake transaction before it is finished. Our previous study 
on the SEE service has shown that to finish a fake transaction, the hired human 
laborers have to follow the operational steps predefined by the SRE market operators 
and it usually takes them several days to complete a fake transaction. Thus we 
could first research on the operational strategies that were specially designed for 
conducting fake transactions and then leverage the inferred behavioral patterns of 
human laborers on the e-commerce sites as the signature to identify fake transactions 
in time. We plan to cooperate with one large e-commerce marketplace to implement 
and deploy the detection system.
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